







The problem upon which this Article will focus can perhaps
best be illustrated by the following hypothetical scenario:'
The United States, through the Department ofJustice, has brought a
civil antitrust suit against IBM, alleging a number of antitrust viola-
tions. One of these is IBM's practice of leasing rather than selling its
machines. 2 After appropriate preliminary sparring, the parties enter into
a settlement of the suit which, once approved by the court and incorpo-
rated into a consent decree, bars the practice of leasing unless purchases
are also permitted on terms which "shall have a commercially reasonable
relationship to the lease charges. '3 Alternatively, the settlement negotia-
tions fail, the case goes to trial and, after several appeals and remands,
final judgment is entered against IBM to the same effect.
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' The scenario represents a version of part of the complaint of Data Processing
Financial & General against IBM which was at issue in Control Data Corp. v. Interna-
tional Business Mach. Corp., 306 F. Supp. 839 (D. Minn. 1969), aff'd sub nom. Data
Processing Financial & Gen. Corp. v. International Business Mach. Corp., 430 F.2d 1277
(8th Cir. 1970). Because the court dismissed this portion of the complaint, no finding on
the accuracy of DPF&G's allegations was ever made. This Article certainly does not
express any opinion on that question.
Such a practice may, in appropriate circumstances, be a violation of § 2 of the
Sherman Act. United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass.
1953), aff'd per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954).
' The consent decree in United States v. International Business Mach. Corp., 1956
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For several years IBM unquestionably complies with the terms of the
judgment, during which time a number of businesses spring up which
purchase new machines directly from IBM and lease them in competition
with IBM's leasing program. Then IBM changes its pricing formula for
purchases, arguably ceasing compliance, and, in any event, threatening
the businesses of those who formerly flourished in the shade of the decree.
The businesses which were beneficiaries of the decree (us-
ing "beneficiary" merely as a factual description) may be fortu-
nate. The Department of Justice, either on its own initiative or
prompted by the complaints of the decree beneficiaries, may
institute contempt proceedings against IBM. But this remedy
may be inadequate in two ways. First, even if compliance is even-
tually renewed, the decree beneficiaries will not necessarily be
compensated for damage suffered during the period of
violation.4 Second, obtaining future compliance depends on an
Antitrust Division with much to do and relatively few resources
with which to do it. Even meritorious complaints to the Depart-
ment may not result in contempt proceedings. 5 This is particu-
larly true to the extent that such proceedings might involve the
Trade Cas. 68,245 (S.D.N.Y. 1956), so provides in § IV(c)(2). The end to be achieved by
this and other provisions of the decree is described in § IV(a):
It is the purpose of this Section IV of this Final Judgment to assure to users and
prospective users of IBM tabulating and electronic data processing machines at
any time being offered by IBM for lease and sale an opportunity to purchase
and own such machines at prices and upon terms and conditions which shall not
be substantially more advantageous to IBM than the lease charges, terms and
conditions for such machines.
Consistant with this purpose, § IV(b) of the decree orders IBM not only to sell on "not
substantially more advantageous terms" what it offers for "lease and sale" but also to
offer for sale machines previously available only by lease.
4 In a civil contempt proceeding the court might condition the defendant's purging
itself of contempt on payment of damages to the decree beneficiaries. Cf. McComb v.
Jacksonville Paper Co., 336 U.S. 187, 193-95 (1949), where the Court upheld the district
court's order that, at the government's motion, the respondents pay workers lost wages
resulting from violations of an earlier decree requiring the workers be paid in accordance
with the Fair Labor Standards Act. However, the availability of such relief will again
depend largely on the government's willingness to press for it. That willingness is likely
to be significantly influenced by the intensity of the defendant's opposition to contempt,
which in turn will increase in direct proportion to the monetary stakes.
5 Posner, A Statistical Study of Antitrust Enforcement, 13 J. LAW & ECON. 365, 387
(1970), indicates that as of 1969 a total of 22 criminal contempt proceedings for viola-
tions of antitrust decrees were initiated, of which only 12 resulted in some penalty being
imposed. This lends support to the historic criticism of the Department of Justice for
failing to police compliance with the decrees it obtains, whether by consent or after
litigation. E.g., W. HAMILTON & I. TILL, ANTITRUST IN ACTION 92-95 (TNEC Monograph
No. 16, 1940); HousE CONM. ON THE JUDICIARY, ANTITRUST SUBCOMM., REPORT ON THE
CONSENT DECREE PROGRAM OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 16-19
(1959); Phillips, The Consent Decree in Antitrust Enforcement, 18 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 39,
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difficult question whether there was a "commercially reasonable
relationship" between sale and lease charges. Thus, the Division
might, quite justifiably, decide to deploy its resources in other
areas.
6
If reliance on Department of Justice action is likely to be
misplaced, the question of alternative means of obtaining relief
arises. Two come to mind quickly, but neither qualifies as a
certain, inexpensive, and efficacious enforcement device. The
aggrieved parties can complain to the court which issued the
judgment in question since the court has the power to punish for
criminal contempt sua sponte. 7 However, except in the most bla-
tant cases, which certainly do not include our hypothetical, it is
unlikely that the court will act without the prompting of a party
to the suit. A second alternative offers a somewhat greater
chance for success, namely, a private antitrust action brought by
the decree beneficiaries. The problem with this approach for the
plaintiff is that he will usually have to demonstrate considerably
more than mere breach of the provisions of the judgment in
order to make out a violation of the antitrust laws. Consider, for
example, our hypothetical. There is nothing illegal per se about
merchandising solely through lease agreements. In order to
prove, for example, a Sherman Act section 2 violation within the
doctrine of United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp. ,8 the plain-
50-53 (1961); Note, Closing an Antitrust Loophole: Collateral Effect for Nolo Pleas and Govern-
ment Settlements, 55 VA. L. REV. 1334, 1344 (1969). Perhaps in recognition of this criticism,
the Department of Justice formally established a Judgment Enforcement Unit in late
1970 to increase compliance. Whether this new unit will have significant effects remains
to be seen.
However, there is good reason to believe that the unit will not prove a panacea in
light of the limited expectations within the Antitrust Division itself relating to its future
performance. As the Division's Director of Operations wrote, "we cannot, of course,
maintain a continuing surveillance of all judgments; but we hope to be able to take a look
at every judgment, either preliminarily or thoroughly, every 10 years." Rashid, The Three
E's of Consent Decrees-Execution, Entry, and Enforcement, 16 ANTITRUST BULL. 301, 314
(1971).
6 This decision will presumably be based on a cost-benefit calculus incorporating a
number of factors. One consideration is the importance of the violation in the particular
industry at issue when compared with the other matters clamoring for the Division's
attention in light of the relative impacts on the competitive functioning of the entire
economic system. A second factor, closely related to the first, is the comparative effi-
ciency of deployment of government resources in one mode rather than another in terms
of the deterrent effects to be achieved. A third consideration is the amount of resources
which will have to be devoted to achieve the desired effects of the various alternatives.
' See generally Gompers v. Buck Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418 (1911); MacNeil v.
United States, 236 F.2d 149 (1st Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 912 (1956); Kienle v.
Jewel Tea Co., 222 F.2d 98 (7th Cir. 1955).
8 110 F. Supp. 295, 345-46 (D. Mass. 1953), aff'd per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954).
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tiff must also demonstrate that IBM had monopoly power-not
an inconsiderable task. The difficulty of such proof is likely to
have serious consequences, since, except for the class of per se
offenses, the legality of the conduct proscribed by consent de-
crees will turn on the economic consequences in particular cases. 9
Accordingly, from plaintiffs' point of view, there would be
considerable utility in some device which would permit them to
seek enforcement of the consent decree provisions directly and
as of right. It is the purpose of this Article to explore two legal
theories by which a plaintiff may attain this end: (1) the notion
that, under traditional contract law principles, the decree ben-
eficiary is entitled directly to enforce the decree as a third party
beneficiary of the settlement contract, and (2) the possibility of
postjudgment intervention by a beneficiary to enforce the de-
cree, whether the decree is the result of bargaining or litigation.
It is the thesis of this Article that both avenues ought to be
available to private plaintiffs in appropriate circumstances.
Before beginning to consider these theories, it is important
to flesh out the background of the problem by sketching the
central role consent decrees play in the government's civil anti-
trust enforcement. The Antitrust Division prefers such settle-
ments to litigation because of the savings in its resources. Such
decrees avoid usually complex and protracted litigation and
eliminate uncertainty of outcome. For these same reasons, anti-
trust defendants will often choose to enter into consent decrees.
Furthermore, for defendants such a resolution avoids an adjudi-
9 For a listing of the kinds of conduct barred by consent decrees but not necessarily
illegal under the antitrust laws, see Flynn, Consent Decrees in Antitrust Enforcement: Some
Thoughts and Proposals, 53 IOWA L. REv. 983, 999-1003 (1968). There are at least two justi-
fications, from the government's viewpoint, for prohibiting such practices. First, the gov-
ernment may well believe that the particular conduct, in the economic context in which it
appears, does constitute an antitrust violation under traditional "rule of reason" analysis.
Second, as an official of the Antitrust Division put it:
Quite often . .'. the injunctive relief necessary to prevent recurrence of the
violation must be supplemented by other prophylactic relief designed to remedy
the past effects of the illegal practices and to create an atmosphere where these
effects will not be carried over automatically into the future. This approach was
recently reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in the Ford Autolite case.
Rashid, Consent Decrees-Putting Procedures in Focus, N.Y.L.J., June 23, 1972, at 4, col. 1.
See United States v. DuPont & Co., 366 U.S. 316, 326 (1961). Ford Motor Co. v. United
States, 405 U.S. 562 (1972), does contain language to the effect that relief must be
directed "to eliminate the effects" of violations. Id. at 573 n.8 (emphasis in original). How-
ever, that language was concerned with relief obtained after trial, so Mr. Rashid may
have somewhat overstated the Supreme Court's position on what he terms the prophylac-
tic purpose of consent decree provisions.
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cated determination of anticompetitive conduct which may later
be asserted as prima facie evidence of antitrust violations in sub-
sequent treble damage actions instituted by private parties.10
These considerations explain the widespread use of consent
decrees."1 Further, since entry of a consent judgment is a substi-
tute for enforcement of antitrust statutory prohibitions through
trial and final judgment, the consequences anticipated to flow
from adherence to the decree are similar to those expected to
follow a litigated settlement. Revitalization of competitive eco-
nomic behavior within the affected industry should occur. Simi-
larly, as in our scenario, new competitors, or even new indus-
tries, may arise in the resulting environment, protected by the
strictures of the decree from the former anticompetitive prac-
tices of the defendant. So long as adherence to the consent
judgment continues, the decree's policies are perpetuated. The
difficulty arises, however, when the consent decree is disobeyed.
II. THE USE OF THE CONSENT DECREE
AS A CONTRACT BASIS
FOR THIRD PARTY BENEFICIARY RIGHTS
The possibility of third party beneficiary contract rights aris-
ing out of consent decree settlements has not been the subject of
scholarly attention.12 This is odd in view of the widespread rec-
'"See note 14 infra.
11 While the extent of use of the consent decree by the Department of Justice has
fluctuated, it has always been high. See Posner, supra note 5, at 375, indicating that
consent judgments from 1915-69 have never in any five year period dropped below 65%
of all civil antitrust judgments in favor of the government. The figure has risen as high as
90%. Compare Comment, Consent Decrees and the Private Action: An Antitrust Dilenma, 53
CALIF. L. REV. 627, 628 n.8 (1965), with Flynn, supra note 9, at 985 n.3.
12 Perhaps the closest that commentators have come to this issue is the suggestion of
legislation which would authorize private parties to seek enforcement of government
consent decrees through either an injunction or damage remedy. Comment, supra note
II, at 647. This proposal has also been approved by Flynn, supra note 9, at 1016.
Although this recommendation is endorsed here, the thrust of this Article is that such a
right may be found without resort to Congress. See also Note, Antitrust Consent Decrees: A
Proposal to Enlist Private Plaintiffs in Enforcement Efforts, 54 CORNELL L. REV. 763 (1969).
The Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act, Pub. L. No. 93-528 (Dec. 21, 1974), does not
seem to affect the theories considered here. An examination of the statute and its legisla-
tive history reveals no intent to recognize a direct right of third parties to enforce court
decrees. The Act does amend Clayton Act § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 16 (1970), by adding a new
paragraph (b) which requires a public impact statement to be submitted by the Depart-
ment of Justice to the district court with every proposed consent degree providing, inter
alia, a statement of "the remedies available to potential private plaintiffs damaged by the
alleged violation in the event the proposed judgment is entered." This, however, seems to




ognition of the central role played by the consent decree in gov-
ernment civil antitrust enforcement which has led to detailed
examination of almost every other aspect of the phenomenon. 13
Even the extensive treatment given the effect of consent decrees
on private treble damage actions under the antitrust laws 4 has
not led to exploration of the present problem.
Indeed, the only discussions of the question have been in
the opinions of the three courts which have dealt with the
theory, and none of these is very satisfactory. It is the purpose of
this portion of the Article to undertake a thorough consideration
of the doctrinal and policy bases of the theory that nonparties to
a decree have third party beneficiary rights under contract law
to enforce those decrees that can fairly be said to have been
13 Concern with the consent decree program has ranged over a wide spectrum of
opinion. While some have feared that government leverage permits the Antitru'st Divi-
sion to obtain unauthorized relief from downtrodden defendants, see, e.g., Dabney, Con-
sent Decrees without Consent, 63 COLUm. L. REV. 1053 (1963); McHenry, The Asphalt
Clause-A Trap for the Unwary, 36 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1114 (1961), others have been concerned
that the cloak of secrecy which surrounds settlement negotiations may disguise the bar-
tering away of the public interest for private gain. United States v. International Tel. &
Tel., 349 F. Supp. 22 (D. Conn. 1972), aff'd sub nom. Nader v. United States, 410 U.S. 919
(1973). See generally Note, The ITT Dividend: Reform of Department of Justice Consent Decree
Procedures, 73 COLum. L. REV. 594 (1973). Likewise, although consent decrees have been
criticized for the inflexibility they may build into government enforcement, see, e.g., Note,
Flexibility and Finality in Antitrust Consent Decrees, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1303 (1967); Note,
Requests by the Government for Modification of Consent Decrees, 75 YALE L.J. 657 (1966),
others have been concerned that antitrust defendants will lose the benefit of their bar-
gains if the decrees are too readily subject to modification or liberalizing construction.
See, e.g., Handler, Twenty-Fourth Annual Antitrust Review, 72 CoLum. L. REV. 1, 19-34
(1972).
4 Section 5(a) of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 16 (a) (1970), provides that plaintiffs
in private antitrust suits may use "final judgments" obtained by the United States in civil
or criminal antitrust actions as prima facie evidence, except for "consent judgments or
decrees entered before any testimony has been taken." Accordingly, the question what
constitutes a consent judgment has received considerable attention, especially with re-
spect to the status of pleas of guilty and nolo contendere in criminal actions. It now seems
established that nolo pleas constitute consent judgments within the meaning of Clayton
§ 5(a), Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 323 F.2d 412 (7th Cir.
1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 939 (1964); Twin Ports Oil Co. v. Pure Oil Co., 26 F. Supp.
366 (D. Minn. 1939); however, guilty pleas do not, e.g., Armco Steel Corp. v. North
Dakota ex rel. Hjelle, 376 F.2d 206 (8th Cir. 1967); General Elec. Co. v. City of San
Antonio, 334 F.2d 480 (5th Cir. 1964); City of Burbank v. General Elec. Co., 329 F.2d
825 (9th Cir. 1964); Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., supra. See
generally Seamans, Wilson & McCartney, Use of Criminal Pleas in Aid of Private Antitrust
Actions, 3 DuQ. L. REV. 167 (1965); Note, The Admissibility and Scope of Guilty Pleas in
Antitrust Treble Damage Actions, 71 YALE L.J. 684 (1962); Annot., 10 A.L.R. FED. 328
(1972). On a related issue, see Matteoni, An Antitrust Argument: Whether a Federal Trade
Commission Order is Within the Ambit of Clayton Act's Section 5, 40 NOTRE DAME LAW. 158
(1965). Farmington Dowel Prod. Co. v. Forster Mfg. Co., 421 F.2d 61 (1st Cir. 1970), an-
swered the Matteoni question in the affirmative. See Annot., 10 A.L.R. FED. 307 (1972).
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made for their benefit. The method of approach will be to re-
view the cases which have dealt with the theory, to determine
whether such a right would be consistent with the present doc-
trinal treatment of antitrust consent decrees, briefly to explore
the contract law problems that will be relevant to defining the
extent of any right recognized, and, finally, to examine the
relevant policy considerations.
A. The Case Law
In one of the opening skirmishes in the private monopoliza-
tion suits brought against IBM,15 the district court rejected a
novel theory urged by plaintiff Data Processing Financial &
General Corporation (DPF&G) that it was entitled to recover
single damages from IBM on third party beneficiary contract
grounds for alleged IBM breach of a consent decree entered in a
prior government antitrust action.1 6 This decision was subse-
quently affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
on the basis of the district court's "well-reasoned and clearly
stated opinion." Since that opinion is less than satisfying, despite
the court of appeals' approbation, it is appropriate to begin by
analyzing the stated rationale for Judge Neville's decision.
Control Data Corp. v. IBM involved, for our purposes,i7 a
motion by defendant IBM to strike from the complaint of plain-
tiff DPF&G references to a consent decree entered against IBM
in a prior government antitrust suit. i8 The DPF&G complaint,
predicated on much the same grounds as those sketched in the
initial hypothetical, asserted a third party beneficiary cause of
15 Over the past six years, IBM has been sued by the government and by a number
of private plaintiffs, including, inier alia, Control Data Corp. and Data Processing Finan-
cial & General Corp. in addition to the more famous Telex Corp. v. International Busi-
ness Machines Corp., 367 F. Supp. 258 (N.D. Okla. 1973), rev'd, 1975 Trade Cas. 60,127
(10th Cir. 1975). In the interest of full disclosure, the author should note that he was at
one time involved in the defense of IBM; however, he took no part in the work relating
to IBM's successful attack on the DPF&G third party beneficiary claim.
6 See note 1, supra.
'7 Another portion of the court's IBM opinion struck allegations relating to the
consent decree from the complaint of plaintiff Control Data since those references were
prejudicial and were justified by Control Data only as useful background information to
its antitrust claim. Like references by plaintiffs Applied Data Research, Inc. and Pro-
grammatics Inc. were stricken in the face of both a like attempted justification, and as
support for a prayer that the court hold IBM in contempt for violation of the 1956
consent decree and a 1935 litigated decree, as well as perhaps presenting a third party
beneficiary claim. For our purposes, however, it will suffice to consider the DPF&G
complaint and the court's treatment of it.
I8 United States v. International Business Mach. Corp., 1956 Trade Cas. 68,245
(S.D.N.Y. 1956).
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action. Its reference to the prior consent decree, therefore, obvi-
ously was relevant. The district court held for the defendant,
ruling that the decree would not be admissible at trial "nor will
any claim be sustained based upon alleged violation thereof or
failure to comply therewith."'19
Our consideration of Judge Neville's opinion is somewhat
complicated by the fact that he was concerned with two different
questions: whether a plaintiff asserting an antitrust cause of ac-
tion can found his suit on a breach of the consent decree or seek
to enforce it directly by contempt; and whether a plaintiff can
claim recovery as a third party beneficiary of the prior decree.
Although initially distinguishing between the two issues, the
opinion finally treated them both as being resolved against the
plaintiff's claims for the same policy reasons.2 0 It is, then, ap-
propriate for us to take Judge Neville at his word and consider
all his arguments as applicable to the third party beneficiary
theory. Nevertheless, this unfortunate equating of the third
party beneficiary contention with other attempts to utilize gov-
ernment obtained decrees may explain why some of the judge's
arguments are so far wide of the mark when considered solely
with reference to the third party beneficiary theory.
Judge Neville began his discussion by citing authority for
the proposition that consent decrees (and nolo contendere pleas
in criminal cases) are not admissible as prima facie evidence
under section 5 of the Clayton Act.2I This is quite correct, but it
simply does not support the court's decision that such decrees
are inadmissible for any purpose. 2 If DPF&G stated a contract
cause of action, it would be odd-to say the least-if the contract
could not be considered in evidence.
We must, therefore, turn to the underlying question
whether such a contract cause of action exists. Judge Neville
began by citing four cases for the proposition that "[t]he law is
rather clear that a third party, a stranger to the decree and not a
party to the government action either directly or by intervention,
" 306 F. Supp. at 843-44.
20 "Plaintiff DPF&G is attempting to do indirectly [via the third party beneficiary
claim] what it cannot do directly [by founding an antitrust cause of action on mere
violation of the consent decree] and the same policy reasons as press for not permitting third
parties and private treble damage plaintiffs to enforce an antitrust decree orjudgment apply equally
to the contract third party beneficiary contention." Id. at 848 (emphasis added).
21 See note 14 supra.
22 306 F. Supp. at 844.
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cannot attempt to enforce it against the defendant. '2 3 However,
the cases cited do not support so broad a rule. One held only
that a violation of a consent decree did not necessarily constitute
a violation of the antitrust laws for which treble damages are
available.2 4 Since we have seen that a consent decree may forbid
actions not per se illegal under the statute, this is a perfectly
sensible position for which plentiful authority exists.25 But it
simply is not relevant to the question whether single damages or
injuctive relief on a contract theory ought to be available.
Two other cases relied on by Judge Neville were also of
dubious relevance to the question before him. Both held, at
most, only that a private plaintiff has no standing to seek to hold
a defendant in contempt for violation of a consent decree.26
Considering the stringent nature of the contempt sanction,
which may culminate in imprisonment or fines beyond the dam-
ages suffered by the injured party,27 these cases plainly are not
determinative whether such a plaintiff can employ contract
remedies for breach of a decree.
2 1 Id. at 845.
24 Paul M. Harrod Co. v. A.B. Dick Co., 194 F. Supp. 502 (N.D. Ohio 1961).
15See notes 8 & 9 supra, & accompanying text. Accord, Burkhead v. Phillips Pe-
troleum Co., 308 F. Supp. 120 (N.D. Cal. 1970); Steel v. American Broadcasting-
Paramount Theatres, Inc., 1961 Trade Cas. 70,175 (S.D.N.Y. 1961); Ida Amuse-
ment Corp. v. RKO Pictures Corp., 1954 Trade Cas. 67,837 (S.D.N.Y. 1954); Brownlee
v. Malco Theatres, 99 F. Supp. 312 (W.D. Ark. 1951); Tivoli Realty v. Paramount Pic-
tures, Inc. 80 F. Supp. 800 (D. Del. 1948).
26 United States v. American Soc'y of Composers, Authors and Publishers, 341 F.2d
1003 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 877 (1965); United States v. Paramount Pictures, 75
F. Supp. 1002 (S.D.N.Y. 1948). In fact, neither decision is clear authority even for the
limited proposition that a private plaintiff has no standing to bring civil contempt pro-
ceedings. In the ASCAP case this principle constitutes no more than an alternative hold-
ing since the court determined that there had been no violation of the decree in any
event. And Paramount Pictures is distinguishable since the district court relied on unusual
language in the decree to the effect that jurisdiction was retained to enable "any of the
parties to the judgment and no others to apply to the court at any time . . . for the
enforcement of compliance therewith, and for the punishment of violation thereof.....
75 F. Supp. at 1003 (italics added).
27 While this Article will not consider at length whether nonparties should be permit-
ted to seek contempt citations against those who violate antitrust decrees, the Supreme
Court's decision in Terminal R.R. Ass'n v. United States, 266 U.S. 17 (1924), casts doubt
on the correctness of the Second Circuit's determination in ASCAP. Terminal involved an
attempt by certain "west side lines" to have the Association and the "east side lines"
adjudged guilty of contempt for violation of an antitrust decree. Although holding
against petitioners on the merits by finding no contempt, the Court had no difficulty with
their right to seek such relief which apparently was not challenged.
Terminal is factually different from ASCAP in that the petitioner west-side lines were
codefendants with the east-side lines in the original action, and thus parties to the decree,
a fact which the ASCAP court found "crucial." But it is not clear why this difference
should warrant a legal distinction. If the purpose of allowing the petitioners to seek
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The final case relied on by Judge Neville furnishes no
stronger support than the first three for the rule that a "stranger
to the decree" cannot attempt to enforce it. In United States v.
United States Gypsum Co.28 the United States had previously
brought an antitrust action against United States Gypsum and
other defendants for patent related violations, and eventually
obtained a favorable judgment. Defendant Gypsum thereafter
filed actions in other courts for patent royalties against four of
its codefendants in the government suit. The defendants
petitioned the district court which had issued the antitrust de-
cree to enjoin Gypsum from proceeding because that decree
barred such suits. In the face of Gypsum's contentions that only
the government, as the original complainant, could enforce the
decree, the court held that "where a dissolution decree by ex-
press statement or by fair implication therein accords rights to
parties thereto, they have standing, in the main suit to enforce
such rights .... -29 Apparently the IBM decision read this case as
establishing that only parties can enforce such rights. But it is
evident that the question at issue in Gypsum was simply whether
at least such parties could do so.
It is true that the Gypsum opinion does lay considerable
stress on the fact that the petitioners were parties to the original
suit. For example, the court writes:
Parties to an original anti-trust suit have a status
therein which often does not apply to outsiders. This
arises from the practical effects of the decree upon the
legal rights of the parties. Such a decree is based upon
a determination that the Act has been violated by an ex-
isting economic situation. Necessarily, the relief is such
alteration of that situation as will do away with all un-
lawful features and potentialities. Unavoidably, such
legal surgical operations involve and change the inter-
relationship of the defendants, whose only reason for
contempt is to permit them "to enforce rights . ..under the original decree," one
wonders why the fortuity whether they were parties to that decree should be determina-
tive. Perhaps the ASCAP court felt that the decree represented a balancing of the parties'
interests, making it unfair to subject certain parties to its disadvantages while depriving
them of effectual means for securing its benefits. But this rationale does not stop short of
nonparties, especially if they have, as DPF&G alleged, established businesses in reliance
on the decree, precisely as the government wished at the time the decree was entered.
28 124 F. Supp. 573 (D.D.C. 1954), rev'd on other grounds, 352 U.S. 457 (1957). The
Supreme Court explicitly approved the district court's assumption of jurisdiction.
29 124 F. Supp. at 580.
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being made parties defendant was that they partici-
pated in the violation of the Act. Such decrees are in-
tensely practical. Often, in this readjusting process, a
decree provides not only for duties but also for rights
inter se the parties. Where such rights are given, they
carry to the recipient party the right to urge compli-
ance, within the limits of the decree. 30
Granting this argument as far as it goes, it is not apparent why
"readjustment" should be limited to parties to the original
action. 31 And, interestingly enough, Gypsum looks for support
not only to Terminal R.R. Ass'n v. United States32 which did in-
volve parties to the original action seeking to enforce the decree
by contempt proceedings, but also to Missouri-Kansas Pipe Line
Co. v. United States,33 which did not. In Pipe Line, the Supreme
Court approved intervention by a nonparty seeking to protect its
rights under a consent decree. This is significant because the
Court, in describing the source of the right to intervene, did not
look to the applicable federal rules, but instead focused on a
provision in the decree itself that stated that the petitioner may
"become a party" hereto "for the limited purpose of enforcing
the rights conferred by Section IV hereof. ' 34 Accordingly,
Judge Neville's attempt to rely on the dictum in Gypsum as es-
tablishing that nonparties have no rights is unpersuasive.
Not only do the cases cited by Judge Neville fail to establish
that nonparties have no right to enforce government consent
decrees, but a careful review of the authorities suggests precisely
30 Id. at 579.
31 The main reason for this distinction may have been the Gypsum court's concern
with the Supreme Court decision in Buckeye Coal & Ry. Co. v. Hocking Valley Ry. Co.,
269 U.S. 42 (1925), which denied intervention to nonparties seeking to alter a final
decree. The most obvious ground upon which Gypsum could distinguish Buckeye was the
fact that there a nonparty sought rights. However, Buckeye is also distinguishable from
the IBM situation because it involved an attempt to modify a decree, not to enforce one,
as well as other reasons. Indeed, the Buckeye Court cited "an embarrassment of reasons,"
id. at 47, why the appeal should fail, thus undermining the reliance that may be placed
on any one factor. Beyond the fact that the attempt was to attack the decree, the Court
found res judicata sufficient to bar the relief. Then the Court referred to the status of
the intervenors, characterizing their positions: "They wish to have this temptation to
crime on their part [conspiracy with the defendant] removed, and incidentally have
themselves relieved from obligations which were recognized by the court as valid and
binding .... Id. at 48. Only after these three arguments were made did the Court refer
to the "fundamental objection" that the intervenors were neither parties to the original
suit nor persons who suffered by the original antitrust violation.
32 266 U.S. 17 (1924). See note 27 supra.
33 312 U.S. 502 (1941).
34 Id. at 507.
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the opposite conclusion. First, the Supreme Court's decision in
Pipe Line is certainly susceptible of the reading that the parties to
an agreement which is incorporated into a consent decree can
thereby confer rights on a nonparty. Pipe Line involved an anti-
trust consent decree entered in a government suit against Co-
lumbia Gas and Electric Company. That decree was "designed to
protect Panhandle [Company] from Columbia which had ac-
quired domination of [Panhandle] to stifle its competition.
35
After the government and the defendant both sought modifica-
tion of the decree, Panhandle attempted to intervene to pro-
tect its interest in the original decree. The Supreme Court re-
versed the district court's denial of intervention, writing:
All of these arguments misconceive the basis of the
right now asserted. Its foundation is the consent decree.
We are not here dealing with a conventional form of
intervention, whereby an appeal is made to the court's
good sense to allow parties having a common interest
with the formal parties to enforce the common interest
with their individual emphasis. Plainly enough, the cir-
cumstances under which interested outsiders should be
allowed to become participants in a litigation is, barring
very special circumstances, a matter for the nisi prius
court. But where the enforcement of a public law also
demands distinct safeguarding of private interests by
giving them a formal status in the decree, the power to
enforce rights thus sanctioned is not left to the public
authorities nor put in the keeping of the district court's
discretion.
That is the present case. Panhandle's right to eco-
nomic independence was at the heart of the contro-
versy.3
6
Second, in the ASCAP case,37 which was cited directly by
Judge Neville, the Second Circuit, while rejecting the attempt of
Metromedia, a nonparty, to hold the Society in contempt, did
point out petitioner's appropriate remedy:
Metromedia's proper recourse . . . was to continue
negotiations with ASCAP for the next few weeks until
'5 As described by the Court in Cascade Natural Gas Corp. v. El Paso Natural Gas
Co., 386 U.S. 129, 134-35 (1967).
36 312 U.S. at 506.
37 341 F.2d 1003 (2d Cir. 1965).
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sixty days had elapsed from the date of its application
[in accordance with the procedure established by the
consent decree to determine royalty disputes]-or, at
least, to make a good faith effort to negotiate during
that period. Failing that, Metromedia then would be able to
invoke the court's jurisdiction for the purpose of determining a
reasonable fee .
3
The obvious question is why one who follows this procedure has
a right to "invoke the court's jurisdiction"; and the only answer is
because the consent decree so provides! Accordingly, the ASCAP
opinion seems to recognize, at least in dictum, the notion of
some enforceable rights in third parties created by a government
antitrust consent decree.
3 9
Admittedly, this reading of ASCAP is not altogether consis-
tent with that portion of the opinion which stresses that the
Department of Justice is "the sole proper party to seek enforce-
ment of government antitrust decrees" and concludes that the
vindication of the public interest requires that the government
have "continuing control" over the suit.40 Although it is doubtful
that the Second Circuit was aware of the internal inconsistencies
in its opinion, we will see that the third party beneficiary theory
does offer a means of reconciling the notion that some rights do
devolve on nonparties from consent decrees contemplating that
result with the desideratum that flexibility be preserved for the
government in its pursuit of the public interest.
If Judge Neville's reliance on authority is less than convinc-
ing, his mustering of "policy" reasons to support the result he
reaches is no more compelling. In all he states seven such
reasons. First, "[t]raditionally and historically only the parties to
a judgment have rights of enforcement thereunder." It is doubt-
ful whether this statement was ever entirely accurate; but in any
3 id. at 1006 n.3 (emphasis added).
39 United States v. Western Elec. Co., 409 F.2d 1377 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S.
876 (1969), is not contrary to this aspect of ASCAP, since the court in Western Electric
merely held that, properly interpreted, the consent decree did not authorize application
to the district court for establishing royalties for past uses of a patent.
40 At one point the court wrote:
Leaving the choice and power to enforce or modify in the government's hands
achieves a desirable result. It forecloses the possibility that a multitude of
parties with conflicting interests will become entangled in subsequent proceed-
ings in the action, and at the same time the continuing government supervi-
sion affords those parties affected by the decree sufficient protection of their
rights.
341 F.2d at 1008.
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event rule 71 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure establishes
that it is not a correct statement of present law in the federal
courts. 41 Further, "traditionally and historically" third party
beneficiary contracts have been enforced by this country's
courts; the opinion gives no reason why this rule should not
apply when the contract has been incorporated in a judgment.
Second, the court argues that the relief plaintiff sought
should be made available only prospectively through legislative
enactment:
Were it to be held that these consent decrees accord
rights to third parties, then retroactively 495 companies
or industries (and perhaps more if several defendants
are involved in one case) would have consequences at-
tached to their consent decrees which undoubtedly their
attorneys who drafted them or advised concerning
them did not contemplate, intend nor expect.
4 2
First, it is clear that this objection is limited to retroactive applica-
tion of the third party beneficiary theory, and has no effect on
future decrees if the Department of Justice should decide to seek
them. Second, the court's description of the consequences of
such retroactive application is unexceptionable as a statement of
fact, but of dubious persuasiveness as a reason for denying the
cause of action. The court properly is concerned with notions of
fairness, but the unfairness of creating retrospectively a third
party beneficiary right is not evident. After all, the defendant
will be under a court order to do (or not to do) the acts which
are the subject of the private suit. It does not lie well in his
mouth to argue that he expected that his obligation to obey
would be enforced only by one means (contempt proceedings
brought by the Department of Justice) rather than another (a
private action for damages). In either case he is merely being
compelled to do that which he has promised in the consent
negotiations, and that which he is obliged to do in any event
under the court order.
Third, the court notes that "[w]ere plaintiffs' contentions
upheld, certainly it would be very apt to foster litigation from
multiple sources. '43 There are at least two responses to this ar-
41 FED. R. Civ. P. 71 states in pertinent part: "When an order is made in favor of a
person who is not a party to the action, he may enforce obedience to the order by the
same process as if he were a party ...." See notes 119-20 infra & accompanying text.
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gument. Assuming it to be true, it ought not to be conclusive.
Against this problem must be weighed the advantages of litiga-
tion which promotes greater compliance with court orders.
Further, it is doubtful that a net increase in litigation will result.
Precisely the opposite will occur to the extent that private en-
forcement of consent decrees by third party beneficiary contract
suits replaces treble damage antitrust suits because the issues in
the former action will usually be much simpler than those in-
volved in an antitrust case. Even if the contract claims are cou-
pled with antitrust causes of action, as in the IBM case, signifi-
cant complication of the suit is not likely to result in view of the
usual simplicity of the factual issues on the contract claim.
The fourth stated policy reason for the court's result ap-
pears on its face to be more substantial, but survives analysis no
better than the first three:
If plaintiffs were to prevail, the practice and feasibility
of entering antitrust consent decrees as contemplated
by Congress might virtually disappear. A company
charged with an antitrust violation might well reason
that it has little to lose by a trial of its case even should it
be unsuccessful, since the alternate of entering into a
consent decree thereafter is going to be usable against it
in damage actions in any event. Certainly the govern-
ment would be hampered in attempting to procure con-
sent decrees. 44
Judge Neville is plainly right that any rule that makes consent
decrees more onerous for a defendant may tend to discourage
his willingness to agree to them. But he ignores two critical
points. First, since third party beneficiary rights are created by
the parties to the contract, the parties are also free to negate
such rights. Not only will the Department of Justice not find its
hands tied, it will gain greater flexibility from having court rec-
ognition that it has the option to create a third party beneficiary
right of action. Second, this is not a case of attempting to use the
consent decree to impose liability for past actions. A consenting
defendant will have no liability arising from the decree unless he
breaches it in the future. Accordingly, the only defendant who
would have settled the government suit but for the third party
beneficiary theory is the one who settles with the intention
of disobeying the court's order, counting on the Justice De-
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partment's inadequate resources to escape enforced compli-
ance. There is no public interest in inducing such a defendant to
agree to a consent decree.
The fifth and sixth policy reasons cited by the court against
third party enforcement of consent decrees are related and may
be treated together. Judge Neville writes:
To permit the parties in effect by their private negotia-
tions and stipulations to enlarge, narrow or otherwise
define the scope of the antitrust laws in a consent de-
cree so as to create a cause of action in a third person,
raises the question of an unauthorized delegation of
legislative power.45
This singular statement is perhaps explained by the court's
reference immediately afterward to Paul M. Harrod v. A.B. Dick
Co. 46 which, as we have seen, 47 held that a violation of a consent
decree was not necessarily a violation of the antitrust laws. To
the extent that the IBM court was merely asserting that treble
damages are not available for consent decree violations, the
court's language is not troublesome. If the phraseology was
meant to apply to the third party beneficiary claim, however, it
can only mean that the government cannot create by contract
third party beneficiary rights, a proposition clearly contrary to
the great weight of authority, 48 including a case later cited in the
opinion itself.
49
A similar problem exists with respect to the court's sixth
argument: "To permit enforcement of an antitrust consent de-
cree by third parties in reality makes the decree a statute con-
tinuing perhaps in perpetuity, and one, withal, not enacted by
Congress."5 ° It is not clear why permitting contract enforcement
by third parties does not make the-decree "in reality" a contract.
Further, the decree is enforceable in perpetuity already: the only
question is whether the enforcement may be by private action
for damages in addition to the government seeking contempt. It
4
5Id.
46 194 F. Supp. 502, 504 (N.D. Ohio 1961).
47 See text accompanying note 24 supra.
4s See text accompanying notes 98-107 infra.
49 Lemon v. Bossier Parish School Bd., 240 F. Supp. 709 (W.D. La. 1965), aff'd, 370
F.2d 847 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 911 (1967). See also Weinberger v. New
York Stock Exch., 335 F. Supp. 139 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
50 306 F. Supp. at 846.
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is hard to imagine why the decree is more or less a "statute" in
the one case than the other.
It may be that underlying the court's obvious concern about
adding to the means of enforcing consent decrees are reserva-
tions about the legitimacy of the decrees themselves, even when
enforced by the government. For example, to the extent that the
relief the government obtains by a consent decree includes bar-
ring conduct which might be perfectly legal under the antitrust
laws, the problem of government overreaching presents itself.
Without examining the merits of this issue, 51 it should at least be
clear that it is not a persuasive objection to nonparty enforce-
ment of consent decrees. Such decrees ought to be either permis-
sible or not, without regard to who seeks to enforce them. It is
true, of course, that less enforcement of possibly suspect decrees
would result if fewer persons were authorized to enforce. But
the same effect could be achieved, with equal logic, by not allow-
ing even the government to enforce decrees entered on Mon-
days. If good reasons exist to deny third parties per se the right
to enforce consent decrees, that should be the policy basis for
denying such persons contract beneficiary status. A mere
generalized hostility to consent decrees will not suffice.
For its seventh and final policy argument, the court reverted
to the contention that recognition of third party beneficiary
rights will undercut the proviso to section 5(a) of the Clayton
Act which excludes consent decrees from the prima facie evi-
dence effect given decrees entered after testimony has been
taken. The court, however, is mistaken in its interpretation of
the statute. 52 The main thrust behind section 5(a) was a desire to
facilitate "private attorney general" enforcement of the antitrust
laws by providing assistance to private plaintiffs in proving
The problem has frequently been adverted to in passing in the literature but never
carefully considered, at least with respect to antitrust consent decrees.
.52 15 U.S.C. § 16 (a) (1970). The relevant text of the provision is as follows:
A final judgment or decree heretofore or hereafter rendered in any civil or
criminal proceeding brought by or on behalf of the United States under the
antitrust laws to the effect that a defendant has violated said laws shall be prima
facie evidence against such defendant in any action or proceeding brought by
any other party against such defendant under said laws . . . as to all matters
respecting which said judgment or decree would be an estoppel as between the
parties thereto: Provided, That this section shall not apply to consent judgments
or decree entered before any testimony has been taken ....
On the effects of using a decree as' prima facie evidence, see Emich Motors Corp. v.
General Motors Corp., 340 U.S. 558 (1951). See generally Timberlake, The Use of Govern-
ment Judgments or Decrees in Subsequent Treble Damage Actions Under the Antitrust Laws, 36
N.Y.U.L. REv. 991 (1961).
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violations. 53 It was recognized, however, that to apply this prin-
ciple across the board would seriously hinder government en-
forcement efforts by removing an incentive for defendants to
settle. Accordingly, section 5(a) was carefully tailored to balance
these two competing interests: a final judgment obtained by the
United States is prima facie evidence of defendant's violation of
the antitrust laws, unless it is a consent decree "entered before
any testimony has been taken." In this context it is plain that any
congressional intent to "benefit" consenting defendants is purely
subsidiary to assisting the government in obtaining consent de-
crees in the sense that, had Congress been able to aid private
plaintiffs without hindering government enforcement, it would
have done so. Since Congress cannot be presumed to want to
encourage consent decrees which would not be enforced, there is
no inconsistency between immunizing consenting defendants
from the prima facie evidence effect of past violations and giving
a third party beneficiary cause of action to private plaintiffs for
future breaches of them. The statutory provision would continue
to encourage defendants who intended to abide by consent de-
crees to enter into them. Thus, the decrees would be better
obeyed, while private parties would be benefited. It is difficult
to imagine a better accommodation of the divergent purposes of
section 5(a) than could be achieved by recognition of a third
party beneficiary cause of action.
54
5' See, e.g., President Wilson's Special Message to Congress, January 20, 1914, which
states:
I hope that we shall agree in giving private individuals who claim to have been
injured by these processes the right to found their suits for redress upon the
facts and judgments proved and entered in suits by the Government where the
Government has upon its own initiative sued the combinations complained of
and won its suit .... It is not fair that the private litigant should be obliged to
set up and establish again the facts which the Government has proved. He can
not afford, he has not the power, to make use of such processes of inquiry as the
Government has command of. Thus shall individual justice be done while the
processes of business are rectified and squared with the general conscience.
51 CONG. REC. 1962, 1964 (1914).
51 Perhaps some additional light on the purpose of the proviso to § 5(a) can be shed
by an examination of the "asphalt clause" problem. See generally Dabney, note 13 supra;
McHenry, note 13 supra; Note, supra note 12; Comment, Section 5 of the Clayton Act and
Entry of Consent Decree Without Government Consent, 1963 Wis. L..REv. 459. Asphalt clauses
were incorporated into a number of consent decrees at the insistence of the Depart-
ment of Justice including, e.g., United States v. Allied Chem. Corp., 1961 Trade Cas.
V 69,923 (D. Mass. 1960); United States v. Bituminous Concrete Ass'n, Inc., 1960 Trade
Cas. 69, 878 (D. Mass. 1960); United States v. Lake Asphalt and Petroleum Co., 1960
Trade Cas. 69,835 (D. Mass. 1960). The clause admits the charges against defendants
and agrees that the decrees will serve as prima facie evidence in private suits brought
against them by state or local governments, the ones primarily injured by the conspiracy.
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Two other cases, both subsequent to Control Data Corp. v.
International Business Machine Corp., have also considered third
The reasons for this policy are set forth in Bicks, Significant New Antitrust Developments, 17
A.B.A. ANTITRUST SECTION 268 (1960).
The asphalt clauses were quickly attacked on the grounds that the government was
using its leverage to extract from defendant's their "right" not to have a consent decree
used as prima facie evidence in a subsequent private suit.
The question reached the courts in United States v. Brunswick-Balke-Collender Co.,
203 F. Supp. 657 (E.D. Wis. 1962), when the defendants, after both parties had agreed
on the other substantive terms of the consent decrees, petitioned the district court to
enter the decree without the asphalt clause, despite the absence of government consent.
The court ruled for the defendant, holding that § 5 of the Clayton Act barred the
government's position. In so doing it emphasized the absence of any need for the "as-
phalt clause" to prevent future violations of the Sherman Act. In its opinion the court
rejected the government's contention that it was legitimate for it to consider the interests
of private plaintiffs in deciding whether to settle or go to trial:
The right given to antitrust defendants by the proviso to § 5 to avoid the
"prima facie evidence" sanction by capitulation is an unqualified right. No au-
thority or discretion is given to the Department of Justice to deny that right even
to the most flagrant violator nor, a fortiori, can it deny that right to one who by
fortunes of commerce does substantial business with governmental units or
agencies. The Department of Justice here, by withholding its consent, is not only
arbitrarily denying the moving defendants this right but frustrating the clear
intent of Congress to encourage early entries of injunctional decrees without
long and protracted trials.
Id. at 662.
The decision has, not surprisingly, been the subject of considerable criticism. Al-
though the court is correct in its major premise that the government should not be
allowed to extract unconstitutional or unauthorized relief from a defendant as a condi-
tion for settling a suit, see, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, REPORT OF ATTORNEY GENERAL'S
NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAWS 361 (1955), its minor premise
that § 5 bars the asphalt clause is another matter. The court's perception of a congres-
sional intent to create a "right" in defendants to avoid the prima facie effect of consent
judgments is ill-founded, since the purpose of the proviso is to assist the Justice Depart-
ment's enforcement efforts, not to benefit defendants. The Department, therefore,
should be permitted to decide when the avoidance of litigation is desirable, and the mere
fact that the reason for requiring an asphalt clause as a condition for settlement is to fur-
ther the interests of private parties does not necessarily taint the government's decision.
After all, the existence of a private treble damage remedy and the prima facie evidence
provision of § 5(a) itself both demonstrate that Congress did not recognize any inherent
inconsistency in furthering the public interest by permitting private parties to recover
from antitrust violators. As one commentator noted:
But Congress never referred to the "rights" of the defendants in this regard;
Congress was concerned only with the plight of the private parties plaintiff and
with maintaining enforcement flexibility in the Justice Department. Twin Ports
Oil Co. v. Pure Oil Co., as quoted in Brunswick, is mistaken in suggesting that
Congress unequivocally sacrificed private litigant concern for considerations of
economy where consent decree negotiations were appropriate. The court's posi-
tion shackles rather than maintains Government flexibility. The government
apparently believes that it can in this case implement at one stroke the two
values which lay behind section 5. Clearly the 1914 Congress would only ap-
plaud such an effort.
Comment, supra, at 462-63 (footnotes omitted). See also, Flynn, supra note 9, at 1010-15.
The question whether Brunswick represents good law remains open since no other
decision has been handed down. A case involving the issue did reach the Supreme Court,
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party beneficiary rights under government consent decrees, but
neither adds much to the IBM opinion. Bailey v. Iowa Beef
Processors, Inc.,55 a contract action under a third party beneficiary
theory in state court, involved a class action brought for mem-
bers of a labor union as creditor beneficiaries of a government
antitrust consent decree requiring defendant Beef Processors to
divest itself of two packing plants. The decree provided, inter
alia, that pending sale the defendant "shall continue the normal
operations of Blue Ribbon and shall take no action with respect
to the personnel or assets of Blue Ribbon which would impair
[its] ability to accomplish the divestiture. ' 56 Plaintiff claimed that
defendant's two-month closing of one plant and consequent lay-
ing off workers violated these provisions.
The Iowa Supreme Court, after finding that the lower court
had jurisdiction over the action,57 analyzed the plaintiff's claim
under third party beneficiary law without noting any problem in
application of that theory to a consent decree in a government
antitrust suit. An examination of the briefs of the parties shows
that IBM was not brought to the attention of the court. Accord-
ingly, Bailey cannot be read as rejecting its reasoning. Neverthe-
less, it is interesting that neither the attorneys nor the court sua
sponte recognized any problems with applying contract notions.
United States v. Ward Baking Co., 376 U.S. 327 (1964), but no definitive decision was
rendered. There, as in Brunswick, the district court entered a consent decree over the
government's objection. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the government's
contention that the relief provided was not broad enough had "a reasonable basis under
the circumstances." The Court then wrote:
Since we conclude that there was a bona fide disagreement concerning
substantive items of relief which could be resolved only by trial, we need not,
and do not, reach appellees' contention that, where there is agreement on every
substantive item of relief, insistence by the Government upon an adjudication of
guilt as a condition to giving its consent to a judgment would conflict with the
congressional policy embodied in § 5 of the Clayton Act [citing Brunswick]. We
decide only that where the Government seeks an item of relief to which evidence
adduced at trial may show that it is entitled, the District Court may not enter a
"consent" judgment without the actual consent of the Government.
Id. at 334.
In any event, the implications of Brunswick for the development of a third party
beneficiary theory are minimal. Even beyond the question whether Brunswick is good law,
the rationale of the decision does not reach the third party beneficiary situation. Recogni-
tion of a "right" to avoid the prima facie evidence effect of a consent decree with respect
to liability for past antitrust violations says nothing about a "right" to be free from third
party suit for damages suffered from future violations of the consent decree itself.
55 213 N.W.2d 642 (Iowa 1973), cert. denied, 95 S. Ct. 52 (1974).
S6 Id. at 643.
57 The jurisdictional aspects of the third party beneficiary suit are discussed at note
127 infra.
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On the merits, the court affirmed the lower court's dismissal
on the ground that the plaintiff was only an incidental ben-
eficiary of the consent decree. It recognized the propriety of
third party beneficiary suits under the Iowa law of contracts, 58
but found the requisite "intent to benefit" not present. To estab-
lish that element, the plaintiff relied on the intent of the prom-
isee Department of Justice as inferred from its duties under the
Clayton Act. The supreme court, quite rightly, found this ar-
gument unconvincing: the purpose of section 7 of the Clayton
Act is to preserve competition, not to ensure that small units
remain intact. Although the notion of intent to benefit and its
implication for the Bailey case will be considered at length, 59 for
present purposes it is important only to note that the court saw
no reason why an intent to benefit could not, in appropriate
circumstances, be inferred from a consent decree.
The second post-IBM case involving third party enforce-
ment of a consent decree, Manor Drug Stores v. Blue Chip
Stamps,60 is somewhat more complex but may ultimately prove
the most significant decision because the Supreme Court has
granted certiorari. Manor Drug Stores arose out of a prior consent
decree6' requiring reorganization of defendant Blue Chip. The
plan approved by the court required an offering of stock to
retailer-purchasers of Blue Chip stamps, such offering to be reg-
istered under the federal securities laws. The plaintiffs in Manor
Drug Stores alleged that the purpose of the consent decree was to
provide them with stock at a "bargain basement price" in com-
pensation for the damages that they had suffered from the de-
fendants' prior antitrust violations. They also charged that the
defendants sought to avoid the purpose of the decree by placing
in the prospectus misleading statements which induced the
5s The Iowa Supreme Court, and the parties in their briefs, assumed that state
contract law governed, although plaintiff did argue that the Clayton Act was relevant in
determining whether a third party beneficiary right was created. In its petition in the
United States Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, the plaintiff, naturally enough,
emphasized the "federal question" involved in the state court decision since the presence
of such a question was essential to issuance of the writ. Apparently, however, the plaintiff
continued to contend that state law governed whether a federal antitrust consent decree
was a contract, and, if so, what third party rights would be recognized. The possibility
that these questions are federal ones is examined at note 89 infra.
'9 See textual discussion beginning at note 111 infra.
61 339 F. Supp. 35 (C.D. Cal. 1971), rev'd, 492 F.2d 136 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. granted,
95 S. Ct. 302 (1975).
61 United States v. Blue Chip Stamp Co., 1967 Trade Cas. 72,087 (C.D. Cal. 1967).
Other litigation arose out of this decree in the course of an attempt to intervene to
modify. See note 179 supra.
GOVERNMENT ANTITRUST DECREES
plaintiffs not to purchase. This, they concluded, was a violation
of the federal securities laws and a breach of the plaintiffs' rights
as third party beneficiaries under the consent decree.
62
The district court rejected the third party beneficiary claim
without extended discussion, relying mainly on the IBM opinion.
It apparently found persuasive Judge Neville's rationale that al-
lowing third party beneficiary recovery would diminish the in-
centive for defendants to enter into consent decrees. Turning to
the securities law issues, the court held that plaintiffs did not
have a cause of action for damages because they lacked "pur-
chaser-seller" standing within the meaning of rule lOb-5.
63
On appeal to the Ninth Circuit, a panel of that court, in a
two-to-one decision, reversed the district court's dismissal.64 Al-
though the third party beneficiary theory had been abandoned
on appeal, the court did suggest in its discussion of the securities
law issue that the consent decree affected the plaintiffs' rights. It
perceived the purchaser-seller doctrine as rooted in the belief
that, absent a purchase or sale, a plaintiff will rarely be able to
demonstrate a causal nexus between the loss and the alleged
violation. However, where a contract exists between the parties,
it furnishes "objective evidence of the reality of a plaintiff's in-
tention to purchase or sell but for the fraud, and thus of
causation. '65 Having so stated the law, the court then described
the consent decree as "serv[ing] the same function as [a] contrac-
tual relationship,' 66 bringing plaintiffs within the class of those
non-purchasers-sellers allowed to sue.
The implications of the majority opinion for a direct third
party beneficiary contract action are unclear. On the one hand,
the fact that the decree is described as a functional equivalent of
a contract supports such a right. This may be especially signifi-
cant since the comparison was drawn despite Judge Hufstedler's
strong dissent in which she attacked the functional equivalence
notion by arguing that the plaintiffs could not have enforced
rights under the consent decree.6 7 On the other hand, however,
62 Jurisdiction on the contract claim was grounded on federal pendent jurisdiction.
63 On the parameters of this doctrine, see the authorities cited in the Manor Drug
Stores opinions.
64 492 F.2d 136 (1973).
6
5 Id. at 142.
66 Id.
67 The dissent, like the district court's opinion, looks to the IBM decision and Judge
Neville's argument that the third party beneficiary theory will discourage consent decrees
as a "persuasive rationale" for rejecting the rule. Id. at 144 n.3.
1975)
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 123:822
the court may have merely been treating the decree as enough
evidence of a "special interest" in a particular stock offering to
satisfy the requirement of a casual nexus between fraud and loss.
Two footnotes, perhaps mutually contradictory, compound the
uncertainty. At one point the court states that "as defendant-
appellees point out, plaintiff-appellant could not have directly
enforced the decree," 68 and refers to the lower court's dismis-
sal of the third party beneficiary claim. However, this language
is not only dictum on the third party beneficiary theory, but,
perhaps significantly, it also fails expressly to approve either the
defendant's contentions69 or the lower court's decision. Further,
the next footnote states that "an informed decision by plaintiff-
appellant to purchase these shares could not have been thwarted
by the intervention of an earlier or higher bidder. ., "70 thus
perhaps implying that the plaintiffs had some kind of vested
right.
The Supreme Court's grant of certiorari will provide it with
an opportunity to resolve these issues. Unfortunately for our
purposes, however, the posture in which the case appears may
permit it to be decided without a definitive decision on the status
of third party rights under consent decrees. And, in any event,
our review of the few authorities on the question establishes that
it is not clear which way the Court should rule on third party
beneficiary status should it desire to do so. IBM's rationale is un-
satisfactory; Manor Drug Stores is profoundly ambiguous; and
Bailey, while implicitly accepting the theory, also fails to come to
grips with the underlying issues. Accordingly, it is appropriate
to undertake a fresh approach to the problem.
B. The Consent Decree as a Contract
If, as we shall see, the relevant policy reasons suggest the
creation of some kind of third party enforcement device, the
next question is whether the use of the contract law of third
6 8 1d. at 142 n.14.
69 The court referred to Dahl, Inc. v. Roy Cooper Co., 448 F.2d 17 (9th Cir. 1971),
after noting the defendant's contention. That decision rejected a complaint of violation
of a consent decree, but the claim there was not predicated on a third party beneficiary
claim. The Dahl court's conclusory statement that "only the Government can seek en-
forcement of its consent decrees," and its citation to United States v. American Soc'y of
Composers, Authors & Publishers, 341 F.2d 1003 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 877
(1965), suggests that it read the plaintiff's argument as an attempt to cite defendant for
contempt. See notes 26 & 27 supra & accompanying text.
70 492 F.2d at 142 n.15.
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party beneficiaries is an appropriate means of achieving this end.
This, in turn, involves two questions: whether such a notion
conflicts with the antitrust law of consent decrees; and whether
contract law is a suitable instrument to achieve the desired ends.
This latter point will be discussed in part C; it is to the former
that we now turn.
Although one should be rightly hesitant about discussing
what a consent decree "really" is, it is necessary to inquire into
the nature of the beast in order to ascertain if it may be a "con-
tract" for purposes of a third party beneficiary cause of action.
No discussion of antitrust consent decrees can begin elsewhere
than with the Meat Packing Cases.
These involved consent decrees arising out of a suit brought
in 1920 by the Department of Justice against the five leading
meat packers. The decree enjoined the defendants, inter alia,
from engaging in any business ancillary to their central function.
For example, they were barred from engaging or having any
interest in manufacturing, selling, or transporting many enum-
erated food products. 71 After some unsuccessful preliminary
skirmishing, 72 two of the original defendants filed a petition
seeking to modify the decree, The lower court modified it in
some respects, but refused to do so in others. The appeal to the
Supreme Court resulted in Mr. Justice Cardozo's famous opin-
ion in United States v. Swift & Co. 73 Cardozo had to deal with a
number of issues in deciding the case, the first being whether the
courts had the power to modify a consent decree. This power
was conceded by both the original defendants and the govern-
ment, but was challenged by would-be intervenors who argued
that the decree was not an adjudication by a court but a contract
between the parties, and therefore could not be modified with-
out the government's consent. Assuming, without passing on, the
status of the intervenors to object, the Court gave short shrift to
this contention:
We reject the argument for the interveners that a de-
cree entered upon consent is to be treated as a contract
and not as a judicial act. A different view would not
help them, for they were not parties to the contract, if
any there was. All the parties to the consent decree
71 United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 111 (1932).
72 E.g., Swift & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 311 (1928).
-" 286 U.S. 106 (1932).
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concede the jurisdiction of the court to change it. The
interveners gain nothing from the fact that the decree
was a contract as to others, if it was not one as to them.
But in truth [it] was not a contract as to anyone. The
consent is to be read as directed toward events as they
then were. It was not an abandonment of the right to
exact revision in the future, if revision should become
necessary in adaptation to events to be.
74
This passage warrants our examination since it seems to bar
a third party beneficiary right for two reasons: because there is
no contract; and because the Court rejects any third party rights
in any contract that might exist. Further, although a hair-
splitting critic might denigrate either of these points as "mere
dictum," it is clear that together they constitute a holding that
the agreement underlying every consent decree is no bar to
modification. Accordingly, it is appropriate to consider Mr. Jus-
tice Cardozo's language at some length.
It should be noted that the putative intervenors did not
explicitly raise the third party beneficiary theory; therefore the
Court's language that if "the decree was a contract as to others
• . . it was not one as to them" may not have been well-
considered. However, Cardozo was certainly familiar with the
concept of third party beneficiaries,7 " so it is strange that the
possibility did not occur to him in Swift. Perhaps the only expla-
nation for this lapse is that the point merited only passing atten-
tion if the real basis for his decision was that there was no con-
tract at all. This latter conclusion, then, is best viewed as the
holding on this aspect of the case.
At first glance this holding appears conclusive against the
theory espoused here-after all, there can be no contract third
party beneficiaries without a contract. But we should recall the
purpose for which Cardozo found the consent decree not to be a
contract. The would-be intervenors put forth a simple syllogism:
The consent decree is a contract; contracts cannot be modified
without the assent of the parties; ergo, the consent decree cannot
be modified without the assent of the parties. In order to avoid a
result which Cardozo rightly saw as intolerable-the permanent
freezing of consent decrees absent agreement to modify-
7 4
1d. at 115.
' Just four years earlier, while on the New York Court of Appeals, he authored the
opinion in the famous third party beneficiary case of H.R. Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water
Co., 247 N.Y. 160, 159 N.E. 896 (1928).
GOVERNMENT ANTITRUST DECREES
Cardozo simply denied the major premise: a consent decree is
not a contract.
He would, perhaps, have done better either by attacking the
minor premise,7 6 or by cutting through the brittle logic of the
syllogism with the argument that, though a consent decree may
be a "contract" for some purposes, it is one which must be sub-
ject to modification for reasons of social policy inapplicable to
the usual contract. Indeed, the fact that contractual notions are
unavailable to bar modification of consent decrees absolutely
does not mean that they are not frequently employed for other
purposes with respect to such decrees.
Such notions have, in fact, been invoked by the Supreme
Court in at least two different kinds of situations involving con-
sent decrees: modification and interpretation. Swift is itself au-
thority for the judicial power to modify, and Cardozo's opinion
takes some care in expounding the circumstances which warrant
the exercise of that power.77 Although the intricacies of that
question need not here concern us, 78 it is important for our
purpose to note that in at least two post-Swift cases the Court has
adverted to the consensual nature of consent decrees as restrict-
ing the freedom of the courts to modify them. Thus, Mr. Justice
Frankfurter, writing for the Court in Ford Motor Co. v. United
States,79 plainly found that aspect a weighty factor:
The appellants [Ford] agreed for a limited term to re-
frain from pursuing conduct which, in the absence of
an adjudication that it was illegal, they were otherwise
Many contracts are entered into with the expectation of possible modification for
changed circumstances, either by further agreement between the parties in accordance
with certain standards, see, e.g., UNIFORM COMMERCIAL ConE § 2-305, or by arbitration.
Certainly the contract embodied in the consent decree could be viewed as entered into by
the parties with the mutual understanding that it could be modified by court determina-
tion at either's motion because of changed circumstances.
7 We are not doubtful of the power of a court of equity to modify an injunction
in adaptation to changed conditions though it was entered by consent.... Power
to modify the decree was reserved by its very terms, and so from the beginning
went hand in hand with its restraints. If the reservation had been omitted,
power there still would be by force of principles inherent in the jurisdiction of
the chancery. A continuing decree of injunction directed to events to come is
subject to adaptation as events may shape the need. . . . The result is all one
whether the decree has been entered after litigation or by consent.... In either
event, a court does not abdicate its power to revoke or modify its mandate if
satisfied that what it has been doing has been turned through changing circums-
tances into an instrument of wrong.
286 U.S. at 114-15 (citations omitted).
7' See generally Note, HARV. L. REv., supra note 13: Note, YALE L.J., supra note 13.
79 335 U.S. 303 (1948).
1975]
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANL4 L4W REVIEW [Vol. 123:822
free to pursue and which General Motors has always
been free to pursue. There has been no such adjudica-
tion and successive extensions of the term have expired.
The crucial fact now is not the degree of actual disad-
vantage but the persistence of an inequality against
which the appellants had secured the Government's
protection. Yet the Government seeks a change in the
express terms of the decree which would perpetuate
that inequality. The Government has not sustained the
burden of showing good cause why a court of equity
should grant relief from an undertaking well under-
stood and carefully formulated. 80
Likewise, in Hughes v. United States81 the Court reversed the dis-
trict court's exercise of its power to modify, on the ground that
the decree defendant's consent did not extend to the procedure
employed in ordering a sale of certain stock without a hearing
on the necessity of doing so.
The point of these opinions is not that absence of
defendant's consent bars modification but rather that the de-
struction of expectations based upon the original consent decree
imposes a heavy burden on the government when it seeks mod-
ification. The importance of this factor can perhaps be seen by
contrasting Ford and Hughes with the recent Supreme Court de-
cision in United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp.82 where the
Court held the Swift standards for modification not applicable to
a government attempt to modify a litigated decree:
Swift teaches that a decree may be changed upon an
appropriate showing, and it holds that it may not be
changed in the interests of the defendants if the pur-
poses of the litigation as incorporated in the decree (the
elimination of monopoly and restrictive practices) have
not been fully achieved.
The present case is the obverse of the situation in
Swift if the Government's allegations are proved. Here,
the Government claims that the provisions of the decree
were specifically designed to achieve the establishment
of "workable competition" by various means and that
the decree has failed to accomplish this result. Because
time and experience have demonstrated this fact, ac-
80 Id. at 322.
81 342 U.S. 353 (1952).
82 391 U.S. 244 (1968).
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cording to the Government, it seeks modification of the
decree. Nothing in Swift precludes this. In Swift, the
defendants sought relief not to achieve the purposes of
the provisions of the decree, but to escape their im-
pact.8
3
This radically different approach of the Court can be explained
only on two grounds. First, and more probable, is the fact the
defendant's consent was not involved in United Shoe, where the
judgment was entered after litigation. In such a setting the
judiciary may modify the decree free of any concern about
breaching a bargain. A second possible interpretation that
United Shoe marks a full-scale retreat from the former standards
for modification, of any decree, ceased to be tenable after the
Supreme Court's recent decision in United States v. Armour &
Co. 84 involving the same consent decree which had been at issue
in Swift. The provision in question barred Armour from engag-
ing "directly or indirectly" 85 in certain transport services. It was
common ground that an Armour acquisition of Greyhound
would have violated the decree. But the question before the
Court was whether this held true when Greyhound acquired
Armour. In finding no violation-despite a recognition that the
evils, if any, flowing from a Greyhound-Armour acquisition
would be substantially the same as those resulting from an
Armour-Greyhound transaction-the Court, in an opinion by
Mr. Justice Marshall, laid great stress on contractual concepts:
Consent decrees are entered into by parties to a
case after careful negotiation has produced agreement
on their precise terms. The parties waive their right to
litigate the issues involved in the case and thus save
themselves the time, expense, and inevitable risk of liti-
gation. Naturally, the agreement reached normally em-
bodies a compromise; in exchange for the saving of cost
and the elimination of risk, the parties each give up
83 Id. at 248-49. The decree at issue provided that jurisdiction was retained, inter alia,
"to set aside the decree and take further proceedings if future developments justify that
course in the appropriate enforcement of the Anti-Trust Act." This provision in a reten-
tion of jurisdiction clause is most unusual, and the Court could have chosen to rely on
this language; instead, it seemed disposed to establish a more general principle liberaliz-
ing the standard controlling government attempts to modify litigated decrees.
84 402 U.S. 673 (1971). The decision was 4-3. Justices Douglas, Brennan and White
dissented; Justices Blackmun and Black did not participate.
85 Id.
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something they might have won had they proceeded
with the litigation. Thus the decree itself cannot be said
to have a purpose; rather the parties have purposes,
generally opposed to each other, and the resultant de-
cree embodies as much of those opposing purposes as
the respective parties have the bargaining power and
skill to achieve. For these reasons, the scope of the con-
sent decree must be discerned within its four corners,
and not by reference to what might satisfy the purposes
of one of the parties to it. Because the defendant has,
by the decree, waived his right to litigate the issues
raised, a right guaranteed to him by the Due Process
Clause, the conditions upon which he has given that waiver
must be respected, and the instrument must be construed as it is
written, and not as it might have been written had the plain-
tiff established his factual claims and legal theories in
litigation.8 6
This, of course, raises an interesting question: is Armour con-
sistent with Swift? The former focuses on the sanctity of consent
decrees, while the latter upholds the court's power to alter them.
Professor Handler recently argued that there was no fundamen-
tal inconsistency:
The only issue before the Court in Armour was the "nar-
row question" of the proper construction of the Meat
Packers Decree. Armour is in total harmony with the
time-honored view that consent decrees are to be
treated as contracts for purposes of construction. When
Justice Cardozo characterized such a decree in Swift as a
judicial act, it was with reference to the equally time-
honored principle that an injunction is always subject to
adaptation on a showing of changed circumstances.
Hence, Armour and Swift merely reflect the fact that "it
is possible for a court to treat a stipulated judgment as a
contract for one purpose but not for another"-a rec-
ognition that avoids the pitfalls of "lump concept"
thinking.
87
The Handler reconciliation may be too facile. In a narrow sense
of course, Handler is correct since, for example, liability on con-
86 402 U.S. at 681-82 (footnotes omitted, emphasis added in last sentence). The
argument and, indeed, some of the language of this paragraph closely tracks that of
Note, HARV. L. REV., supra note 13.
87 Handler, supra note 13, at 28.
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tempt proceedings may well turn on whether the decree is con-
strued "narrowly" or "broadly." But in a wider sense it will do a
defendant little good to be told that the courts are refusing to
"interpret" the decree he consented to against him, but are
freely "modifying" it to his disadvantage. After all, contempt
proceedings are rare, and the typical corporate defendant is
likely to be much more concerned with the extent to which it can
safely structure its business arrangements in accordance with the
terms of a consent decree that will be stable against change,
whether from modification or construction. The processes are
not as separate and distinct as Handler would have it. This sug-
gests that for Armour to have real meaning, a strict standard must
be applied even to attempts to modify, a result which is permis-
sible only if the liberal approach to modification taken by the
Court in United Shoe Machinery is confined to litigated decrees.
And if a distinction between litigated and consent decrees is to
be drawn, the only reason for doing so is the contractual ele-
ments inherent in consent decrees.
88
Accordingly, contractual notions play an important part in
judicial treatment of consent decrees. Certainly Armour demon-
strates that this is true with respect to interpreting them; and
Ford and Hughes indicate that this is a weighty factor in deciding
whether to modify them. If we wish also to avoid the pitfall of
"lump-concept" thinking, no reason is to be found in the doc-
trines of antitrust law why, despite the language to the contrary
of Swift, a consent decree may not be treated as a contract for
purposes of a third party beneficiary right.
C. Third Party Beneficiary Rights Under Government Consent
Decrees According to the Law of Contracts
Since, as we shall see, on balance third party enforcement
of government consent decrees is desirable from a policy view-
point, and we have seen that the Supreme Court is already pre-
disposed to treat consent decrees as having some of the attri-
butes of contracts, we must now turn to the task of sketching the
88 Professor Handler also suggests a purportedly different basis for drawing a dis-
tinction between consent and litigated decrees for purposes of modification, namely the
relative ease in determining the purposes of a litigated decree as opposed to a consent
decree. Id. 32. Upon analysis, however, this turns out to be no different at all. As the
Court in Annour pointed out, it is the fact that there are different parties with different,
usually conflicting, purposes which renders it impossible to enforce the "purpose" of the
consent decree.
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scope of the third party beneficiary rights under the applicable
law of contracts. This is likely to be federal law; 89 however, since
there is no well-established federal law of third party benefi-
89 Notwithstanding Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), federal common law
governs those situations where a federal question is involved. 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1970).
Since federal questions are not limited to those under federal statutes, the inquiry is not
ended by our determination that violations of the antitrust laws are not involved in our
third party beneficiary theory. See generally C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF THE
FEDERAL COURTS § 60, at 247 (2d ed. 1970); Note, The Federal Common Law, 82 HARV. L.
REX'. 1512 (1969). See also Weinberger v. New York Stock Exch., 335 F. Supp. 139
(S.D.N.Y. 1971). There are two basic reasons why the breach of a consent decree should
be considered a federal question governed by federal law. First, there is the notion,
initially enunciated in Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943), and
later expansively described in United States v. County of Allegheny, 322 U.S. 174 (1944),
as follows: "The validity and construction of contracts through which the United States is
exercising its constitutional functions, their consequences on the rights and obligations of
the parties, the titles or liens which they create or permit, all present questions of federal
law not controlled by the law of any state." Id. at 183. See generally 1AJ. MOORE, FEDERAL
PRACTICE 0.321 (1974); Pofcher, The Choice of Law, State or Federal, in Cases Involving
Government Contracts, 12 LA. L. REv. 37 (1951) (now somewhat dated). Although this
statement is perhaps overbroad in view of subsequent developments, e.g., United States v.
Yazell, 382 U.S. 341 (1966), it still provides a strong basis for a presumption that federal
law should govern federal contracts. With respect to the third party beneficiary theory,
there is no apparent countervailing state interest, unlike the situation in Yazell, so the
presumption ought to control. But see Rhode Island Discount Co. v. United States, 94 F.
Supp. 669 (Ct. Cl. 1951).
A second basis for finding federal law determinative on the issue what third party
beneficiary rights may obtain under a consent decree lies in the close connection of this
theory with the federal antitrust laws. It is intimately related to them simply because the
policy justifications for adopting such a theory are rooted in the desirability of maximiz-
ing enforcement of those laws. One statement of the notion of federal relatedness is
found in Sola Elec. Co. v. Jefferson Elec. Co., 317 U.S. 173 (1942), where the Court dealt
with the doctrine that a licensee was estopped from challenging a price fixing clause in a
patent license. The Court, after noting that it was not clear whether the lower court's
decision on this issue rested on state or federal law, found that point unimportant: "here
a different question is presented-whether the doctrine of estoppel as invoked below is
so in conflict with the Sherman Act's prohibition of price-fixing that this Court may
resolve the question even though its conclusion be contrary to that of a state court." Id. at
175. The Court then rejected the application of Erie:
But the doctrine of that case is inapplicable to those areas of judicial decision
within which the policy of the law is so dominated by the sweep of federal
statutes that legal relations which they affect must be deemed governed by
federal law having its source in those statutes, rather than by local law. [Citations
omitted] When a federal statute condemns an act as unlawful, the extent and
nature of the legal consequences of the condemnation, though left by the statute
to judicial determination, are nevertheless federal questions, the answers to
which are to be derived from the statute and the federal policy which it has
adopted. To the federal statute and policy, conflicting state law and policy must
yield.
Id. at 176. Of course Sola Electric is not precisely on point: the consent decree, though
emanating from attempts to enforce a federal statute, is not itself such a statute.
Nevertheless, the Court's language is certainly broad enough to justify application of
federal law, since federal antitrust policy may be significantly affected by the law applied
to consent decrees. See also Lewis v. Benedict Coal Corp., 361 U.S. 459 (1960); Goldlawr,
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ciaries, 90 we will have to deal with generally accepted principles
which are likely to be incorporated into any federal law.91
If consent decrees may be treated as contracts for the pur-
pose of creating third party beneficiary rights, we must still de-
scribe those situations in which they will be. The analytic tool
which contract law has evolved to make this determination is the
notion of "intent to benefit." Unfortunately, while the concept
resolves those cases where there is a clear statement of the pri-
mary parties' intention whether a designated person may seek
judicial relief, it fails to provide clear guidelines in precisely
those cases where help is most needed-when no such statement
is made.
Further, this general difficulty with third party beneficiary
analysis is compounded by the possibility that somewhat differ-
ent rules apply in the case of government contracts, either be-
cause "intent to benefit" is not the appropriate test or because
Inc. v. Shubert, 276 F.2d 614 (3d Cir. 1960); Sabre Shipping Corp. v. American Presi-
dent Lines, 298 F. Supp. 1339 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). But see Momand v. Twentieth-Century
Fox Film Corp., 37 F.Supp. 649 (W.D. Okl. 1941), which suggests that there remains an
area where state law may appropriately limit remedies for federally created rights. See
generally IA MOORE, supra, 0.323[1] & [2].
Further, the policy reasons favoring application of a uniform federal law are compel-
ling. Most consent decrees will be interstate in effect so that putative beneficiaries in
different states might otherwise find themselves hindered by local laws relating to third
party beneficiaries. Second, the basic justification for creating a third party beneficiary
right is to assist antitrust enforcement; it would be absurd to risk frustration of this end
by permitting local law to bar a beneficiary's suit. Finally, there seems to be no peculiar
state interest in establishing a third party beneficiary rule on this point. Cf. United States
v. Yazell, supra.
'10 It seems likely that the pre-Erie federal general common law relating to third party
beneficiaries will be persuasive but not controlling with respect to such questions arising
under the federal question common law:
And while the federal law merchant, developed for about a century under the
regime of Swift v. Tyson . . . represented general commercial law rather than a
choice of a federal rule designed to protect a federal right, it nevertheless stands
as a convenient source of reference for fashioning federal rules applicable to
these federal questions.
Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 367 (1943). This might prove impor-
tant since there was a fairly extensive body of federal common law on the subject of third
party beneficiaries whose development was cut short by the Erie decision. If that law were
controlling, it is possible that some of the more recent developments in the area would,
technically at least, be irrelevant. See, e.g., Isbrandtsen Co. v. Local 1291, Int'l Long-
shoremen's Ass'n, 204 F.2d 495 (3d Cir. 1953), where the court apparently looked to a
1927 Supreme Court decision to establish the federal law; the governing law was, how-
ever, not important in that case because the court stated that both federal and state law
were the same.
" The notion of a federal common law essentially relates to the power of the federal
courts themselves to choose a rule of decision. The courts may,,of course, look to state
law for the appropriate rule. C. WRIGHT, supra note 89, § 60.
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government involvement itself alters the inference of intent that
is otherwise appropriate. This possibility is supported by emi-
nent authority: both the Restatement of Contracts and the Re-
statement (Second) of Contracts (Tentative Drafts Nos. 1-7) treat
beneficiaries of government contracts separately from other
beneficiaries.
Perhaps we should begin our consideration of the notion of
intent to benefit by turning to the Restatement (Second)'s definition
of "intended" beneficiaries, the only class of beneficiaries which
has the right to seek enforcement of the contract. Such a person
qualifies, absent contrary agreement by the original parties, "if
recognition of a right to performance in the beneficiary is ap-
propriate to effectuate the intention of the parties" and either the
performance will satisfy the promisee's obligation to the third
party or "the promisee intends to give the beneficiary the benefit
of the promised performance. ' 92 In the consent decree situation,
a decree beneficiary certainly might qualify under this defini-
tion. To the extent that the Department of Justice wants to pro-
hibit certain conduct in order to maximize competition, and to
the extent that the Department may view private party enforce-
ment as facilitating the attainment of that goal, one may infer
that recognition of the right will "effectuate the intention of the
parties." Further, these same facts also support the inference
"that the promisee [Department of Justice] intends to give the
beneficiary the benefit of the promised performance," at least
absent indications to the contrary.
The motive of the promisee in extracting a promise for the
benefit of the third party is immaterial. It suffices that the ben-
efit was intended to pass. Illustration 5 to section 133 of the Re-
statement (Second) makes this clear: "C is a troublesome person who
is annoying A. A dislikes him but, believing the best way to ob-
tain freedom from annoyance is to make a present, secures from
B a promise to give C a box of cigars. C is an intended bene-
ficiary ...." Accordingly, the fact that the "ultimate purpose" of
the Department is to improve the competitive functioning of the
economy, rather than increasing profits of a decree beneficiary,
does not demonstrate the absence of the requisite intent to be-
92 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 133 (Tent. Drafts Nos. 1-7, 1973). The
fundamental change brought about by this revision of the original Restatement is to elimi-
nate the distinction between creditor and donee beneficiaries, merging these classes into
the concept of intended beneficiaries.
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nefit. It is not even a strained use of the word "intent" to say that
one who intends an end also intends the means necessary to the
attainment of that end.
Of course the whole notion of "intent" is here, as elsewhere
in the law, problematic. 93 Ultimately, while including actual in-
tent, it goes far beyond that, reaching that species of intent best
described as "constructive"--what the promisee would have in-
tended had he thought about the question. 94 As has often been
observed, it would be better not to speak of this as "intent" at all,
but the usage is too deeply ingrained to challenge now. Not only
is it the everyday approach to statutory interpretation, 95 but it
has a respectable place in the law of contracts.
96
The question, then, is when an intent will be imputed to the
Department of Justice that decree beneficiaries have enforce-
ment rights. But before beginning this inquiry, it is necessary to
consider whether "intent to benefit" has a different meaning
when applied to third party beneficiaries of government con-
tracts. This point was raised in the IBM opinion 97 when, after re-
"See generally A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 776 (1951).
94 In third party beneficiary problems, it is the promisee's intent, actual or construc-
tive, which is crucial. CORBIN, supra note 93, at § 776. The promisor's intent may be
relevant only if he does not have, and reasonably could not have had, knowledge of the
promisee's intent. Even in such cases, the law will usually recognize a third party ben-
eficiary right. The promisor has promised a performance, and it is hard to appreciate his
concern with who enforces that promise. The exception to this is, of course, when the
promisor's breach results in differing consequential damages to the promisee and to the
third party; plainly, under an a fortiori application of the doctrine of Hadley v. Baxen-
dale, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (Ex. 1854), he should not be liable for damages to a party he
could not reasonably foresee.
95 See generally 2A C. SANDS, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 45 (4th ed.
1973).
96 There are justifications for using constructive intent with respect to legislation that
do not apply full force to the interpretation of contracts. For example, the fact that a
statute may be the product of literally hundreds of legislators, each with a potentially
different intent, makes the search for "real" intent impossible. While this kind of prob-
lem is not absent in interpreting contracts, since the parties may have different intents, it
does not rise to the same magnitude as with statutes. Nevertheless, the difficulties are
often severe enough to warrant the search for constructive intent. A classic example of
this kind of judicial reasoning is found in Taylor v. Caldwell, 122 Eng. Rep. 309 (Q.B.
1863), where the court concluded that the continued existence of a theatre was a con-
structive condition of a contract for the use of premises:
There seems little doubt that this implication tends to further the great object of
making the legal construction such as to fulfill the intention of those who en-
tered into the contract. For in the course of affairs men in making such con-
tracts in general would, if it were brought to their minds, say that there should
be such a condition.
Id. at 312.
97 See note 1 supra.
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jecting the whole notion of third party beneficiary rights arising
from a consent decree, Judge Neville added dictum to the effect
that there was no intent to benefit in any event. 98 He cited section
145 of the Restatement of Contracts as establishing a restrictive test
for such beneficiaries. 99
In fact, it seems dubious whether section 145 does establish
a different test for government contracts than for "ordinary"
ones. A careful reading of that provision reveals that intent to
benefit remains critical. Only the phraseology suggests a nig-
gardly reading: section 145 is stated negatively (no beneficiary
rights unless there is an intent to benefit) while section 133, deal-
ing with beneficiaries of nongovernmental contracts, is phrased
positively (beneficiary rights if there is such an intent).
This is not to suggest that the involvement of a government
contract cannot influence the decision on intent to benefit. The
original Restatement plainly had in mind decisions such as the
then-recent case of H.R. Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co., t °° in
which the New York Court of Appeals found no third party
beneficiary right to recover for fire losses resulting from the
failure of a water company to perform its contract with the city
to provide adequate water for fire hydrants. Since the purpose
of the contract plainly was to provide water for the benefit of the
inhabitants, the court had to explain why the intent to benefit
inhabitants with water did not imply the intent to benefit them
by also conferring a right of action for fire losses. This it did in
terms of the excessive liability which the waterworks company
could have had imposed on it under such a state of affairs.' 0 '
The court's reasoning may be reconstructed as follows. The city
98 The relevant language of the decree which Judge Neville was interpreting is
reproduced in note 3 supra. It is not clear what law he was applying in denying intent to
benefit. The problem of the governing law in such suits is treated in note 89 supra.
99 In pertinent part, § 145 of the original RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS (1932) pro-
vides:
A promisor bound to the United States . . . by contract to do an act or
render a service to some or all of the members of the public, is subject to no
duty under the contract to such members to give compensation for the injurious
consequences of performing or attempting to perform it, or of failing to do so,
unless,
(a) an intention is manifested in the contract, as interpreted in the light of
the circumstances surrounding its formation, that the promisor shall
compensate members of the public for such injurious consequences ....
100 247 N.Y. 160, 159 N.E. 896 (1928).
101 Such a conclusion, even in these circumstances, is not inevitable. See, e.g., Gorrell
v. Greensboro Water-Supply Co., 124 N.C. 328, 32 S.E. 720 (1899). See generally A.
CORBIN, supra note 93, § 806.
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wished to benefit its inhabitants by providing them an adequate
water supply. However, to provide them also with a right of
action for consequential damages for breach, would have re-
sulted either in no water (if the company were unwilling to as-
sume such risks) or water at a higher price (if the company
shifted some or all of its costs of increased risk back upon the
purchasers). Accordingly, the city chose a middle ground: the
inhabitants were beneficiaries of the water, but had no right to
sue for consequential damages for failure of it.
1
02
This reasoning justifies the result in Moch, although whether
it represents either the actual intentions of the parties or the best
reading of their constructive intentions is doubtful. What is more
important for our purposes, however, is that Moch does not es-
tablish a rule barring third party beneficiaries of government
contracts, a proposition that would plainly not be the law.'0 3 At
most, Moch suggests that the courts should be hesitant to give
consequential damages as a remedy for breach of third party
beneficiary rights. Since the basis of Moch, the notion of exces-
sive liability, simply does not apply when the remedy sought by
the beneficiary is specific performance (a fact recognized in
Moch),' 0 4 the principle seems to be that a more restrictive stan-
dard for third party beneficiaries of government contracts is
expressly limited to contractual liability for consequential dam-
ages. This is, in fact, the precise position taken by the Restatement
(Second)'s tentative revision of section 145.105
102 The denial of third party beneficiary rights under nondiscrimination clauses in
government contracts with its suppliers can be similarly explained. In Farkas v. Texas
Instruments, Inc., 375 F.2d 629 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 977 (1967), and Farmer
v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 329 F.2d 3 (3d Cir. 1964), the courts found no intent to bene-
fit employees by giving them a private right of action, reasoning that the government's
emphasis on administrative relief and the possible disruption of government contract
performance indicated this result.
103 See generally A. CORBIN, supra note 93, §§ 805-06.
104 Moch explicitly approves prior New York cases holding that the inhabitants of a
city could enforce city contracts with companies providing public services to obtain ser-
vice at the rate schedules provided therein. 247 N.Y. at 166, 159 N.E. at 898.
105 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 145:
(1) The rules stated in this Chapter apply to contracts with a government or
governmental agency except to the extent that application would contravene the
policy of the law authorizing the contract or prescribing remedies for its breach.
(2) In particular, a promisor who contracts with a government or governmental
agency to do an act for or render a service to the public is not subject to
contractual liability to a member of the public for consequential damages result-
ing from performance or failure to perform unless
(a) the terms of the promise provide for such liability; or
(b) the promisee is subject to liability to the member of the public for the
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While such a limitation would be a serious restriction on the
utility of a third party beneficiary right under a government
consent decree, it would not be fatal to such a theory. There
would still be advantages in enabling a decree beneficiary speci-
fically to enforce a contract, without a damage remedy, or in
permitting him to obtain direct damages even if consequential
ones are not available.1 06 It should be clear, however, that the
unavailability of consequential damages would prevent the third
party beneficial right from achieving the full advantages which
we have sketched, simply because of the reduced incentive to
litigate decree violations. There may, however, be a way around
the difficulty.
To begin with, the formulation of section 145 of the Restate-
ment (Second) does not absolutely bar consequential damages.
These are available when either branch of the "unless" clause of
section 145(2) is satisfied. Unfortunately, neither is very helpful
in our situation. The first alternative, section 145(2)(a), would
allow consequential damages only when "the terms of the prom-
ise provide for such liability." While this validates express provi-
sions in future consent decrees, should the Department of Jus-
tice decide to negotiate for their inclusion, it does not reach most
present decrees. The second alternative, section 145(2)(b), is no
more helpful since it imposes on the promisor liability for conse-
quential damages only when the promisee government agency
"is subject to liability to the member of the public for the dam-
ages." The United States is not liable to decree beneficiaries for
violations either of the decree or of the underlying antitrust
laws.
But it should be remembered that the formulation of section
145 is not dispositive. Even if the tentative draft is ultimately
damages and a direct action against the promisor is consistent with the terms
of the contract and with the policy of the law authorizing the contract and
prescribing remedies for its breach.
06 The notions of direct versus consequential damages are often hard to separate,
especially in third party beneficiary cases. An example, however, will demonstrate that
the difference may be significant. If we revert to the original hypothetical, plaintiff
DPF&G's direct damages for the alleged breach of the consent decree promise to sell
IBM machines on no less favorable terms to IBM than leasing them would be the
difference in value between a purchased machine and a leased one since DPF&G would,
of course, be required to mitigate its damages by leasing available machines. Consequen-
tial damages, by way of contrast, might include lost profits if DPF&G went out of business
because it was unable to compete with IBM on the latter's offered lease terms. Clearly,
IBM would be more likely to adhere to a consent decree if liable for consequential
damages than if responsible only for direct damages.
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approved, the Restatement (Second) is at most only persuasive, not
authoritative. And it seems clear that there are good reasons for
granting beneficiaries a right to consequential damages in situa-
tions not covered by the present formulation of section 145. This
is not to say that the notions of excessive liability that underlie
Moch do not have validity; rather it is to assert that their vitality
varies with the circumstances.
The consent decree beneficiary situation is a good example.
If we grant the possibility of large losses resulting from breach, it
still does not follow that consequential damages ought not to be
allowed. While some mercy with decree and promise breakers is
perhaps praiseworthy, this ought not be done at the expense of
innocent third parties. In Moch the justification for not shifting
the loss was apparently a combination of economics and fairness:
since the water rates did not reflect the cost of insurance, it was
unfair to impose liability on the water company; and, presum-
ably, the city felt it was uneconomic to adjust the rates to provide
that additional protection. But with decree beneficiaries, neither
unfairness nor a considered judgment of the economic advan-
tages of nonliability obtains. The antitrust law reflects a societal
policy, presumably furthered by the consent decree, which
should bind the defendant. If either the laws or the expression
of them in the consent decree are mistaken, there are ways to
achieve changes. Failing to seek this, the defendant who violates
a decree has little claim for sympathy when his conduct causes
serious harm to a decree beneficiary.
However, this is not to say that all consequential damages
for breaches of consent decrees ought to be actionable, just as it
is not the thesis of this Article that all breaches of consent de-
crees necessarily give rise to a private cause of action for some
remedy. Rather, the notion of intent to benefit must be applied
both to the fundamental question who has third party ben-
eficiary rights and to the subsidiary, but still critical, question
what rights such a beneficiary has. Without purporting to be
definitive, we turn finally to a consideration of the intent to
benefit concept in its application to the breach of consent de-
crees.
We have already noted that the problem areas in third party
beneficiary law arise when no intention, either way, is clearly
expressed. Accordingly, we are not here concerned with situa-
tions such as that in ASCAP, where the decree provided that
third parties could invoke the jurisdiction of the court for a
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determination of the reasonableness of royalties under a
copyright license, or that in Pipe Line, where the decree provided
for intervention in further proceedings under it.10 7 If these cases
establish a third party beneficiary right under consent decrees,
they still do not provide guidance when the intention of the
parties, actual or constructive, is less clearly manifested.
We can perhaps begin our inquiry with Control Data Corp. v.
International Business Machines Corp. There Judge Neville had to
interpret language in the decree which specified that its purpose
was "to assure to users and prospective users" machines for
purchase at rates competitive with leased machines. 10 8 This is as
close to recognizing a third party beneficiary right explicitly as
any language short of actually so stating: after all, the best way to
"assure" a particular result is to give the party needing assurance
an enforceable legal right to that result. Nevertheless, Judge
Neville found no intent to benefit derivable from such language,
although he failed to offer any persuasive rationale for his posi-
tion. It would seem, then, that the judge's objections to the whole
theory prevented him from focusing clearly on the notion of
intent to benefit.'0 9
This problem need not hinder us. It seems clear that the
purpose of the provision in question, from the viewpoint of the
promisee (the Department of Justice), was to create a second-
hand market in IBM machines which would eventually act as a
brake on IBM's market power over its machines." 0 That re-
quired that machine consumers purchase rather than lease,
which in turn required that at least some prospective purchasers
107 See text accompanying notes 35-40 supra. For an instance in which the decree
explicitly bars third party rights, see United States v. United Fruit Co., 1958 Trade Cas.
68,941 (E.D. La. 1958).
108 For the full text of the relevant paragraph, see note 3 supra.
109 This conclusion is buttressed by the lame way in which Judge Neville dealt with a
precedent he cited as involving third party beneficiary rights arising from a government
contract. Lemon v. Bossier Parish School Bd., 240 F. Supp. 709 (W.D. La. 1965), aff'd,
370 F.2d 847 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 911 (1967). Judge Neville described the case
as: [A] class action brought by Negro children, where the court held them in effect to be
third party beneficiaries of an assurance in writing which was given by the school board
in return for obtaining federal funds for school construction that equal educational
opportunities would be offered to them." 306 F. Supp. at 848. But he then dismissed it
conclusorily: "Clearly this fact situation is not analogous to the case at bar .... " Id.
I10 This was precisely the theory enunciated only three years earlier in United States
v. United States Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953), aff'd per curiam,
347 U.S. 521 (1954). With the correctness of the economic basis of this theory, we need
not now concern ourselves. Cf. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416
(2d Cir. 1945).
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be assured that the consent decree-mandated merchandising
policies be more or less permanent. While some users of IBM
equipment might make their purchase-lease decision on the basis
of present relative cost-benefit analysis, obviously many busi-
nesses would be concerned with having a reliable long term
source of supply. This became true of the leasing companies-
large scale purchasers of IBM machines who leased them in com-
petition with IBM's leases of its own machines. The effect of this
type of business was to achieve precisely what the government
wanted from its consent decree-"second hand" competition
for IBM.
If IBM then, despite Judge Neville's opinion, is a clear case
of intent to benefit prospective users, the facts in Bailey v. Iowa
Beef Processors, Inc. present an equally clear case where tradi-
tional third party beneficiary analysis, classifying the bene-
ficiaries as "incidental," would deny such rights. It will be
recalled 11' that Bailey involved an attempt by employees of a
decree defendant to enforce a provision of the decree requiring
the defendant to keep certain plants in normal operation so as
not to impair its ability to divest. The Iowa Supreme Court rec-
ognized that continued operation was of considerable economic
interest to the employees, but rejected their argument that they
were intended beneficiaries of the decree:
Plaintiff misconstrues the distinction between cred-
itor and incidental beneficiaries. The distinction is not
based on how strongly or adversely one might be af-
fected by the breach of a contract. The distinction ...
depends on whether the contracting parties had and
expressed the purpose to bestow a benefit on the third
person. Any person claiming to be a third-party ben-
eficiary to a contract is bound to feel vitally interested
in it. Such a person will always feel more and more
vitally interested as the economic stakes increase. How-
ever the economic consequences do not necessarily re-
late to the controlling question of whether the parties
who entered the contract intended and expressed an
intention to benefit those claiming to be third party
beneficiaries.
There is no indication in the [Clayton] Act or in the
authorities which interpret it that Congress intended
" See text accompanying notes 55-59 supra.
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employment opportunities to be any more than inciden-
tal benefits arising from the enforcement of the Act.
The fundamental purpose of the Act was to control
monopolies for the direct economic benefit of the entire
public. Plaintiff cites no authorities and we find none
which support a contention that the job opportunities of
defendant's employees were any factor in the enactment
or enforcement of the Act. Indeed, there is no claim or
indication the defendant would offer fewer or poorer
jobs if it had succeeded in achieving what the govern-
ment claimed was a monopoly.'
12
We can accept that, under traditional analysis, the court is
correct. There appears to be no reason why either the govern-
ment or the decree defendant would want to preserve employ-
ment opportunities of the employees per se. For example, if
divestiture were accomplished, the Department of Justice would
not be concerned with whether the divested assets were auto-
mated, or even moved, so long as a viable competitor emerged in
the relevant market. This would then seem to be a perfect case
within the illustrations of incidental beneficiaries to the Restate-
ment (Second)'s section 133.113
It might be argued, however, that traditional contract no-
tions ought to be somewhat modified when applied to the ques-
tion whether a third party has any rights under a consent decree.
For example, IBM involved a situation where the government's
end was increased secondhand market competition; as a means
to that end, the government wished to induce new entrants into
that market. However, the new entrants would be at the mercy
of a monopolist but for the consent decree. In such a context, it
112 213 N.W.2d 642, 646 (Iowa 1973), cert. denied, 95 S. Ct. 52 (1974).
"' RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 133, Illustrations:
15. B contracts with A to erect an expensive building on A's land. C's
adjoining land would be enhanced in value by the performance of the contract.
C is an incidental beneficiary.
16. B contracts with A to buy a new car manufactured by C. C is an inci-
dental beneficiary, even though the promise can only be performed if money is
paid to C.
17. A, a labor union, promises B, a trade association, not to strike against
any member of B during a certain period. One of the members of B charters a
ship from C on terms under which such a strike would cause financial loss to C.
C is an incidental beneficiary of A's promise.
18. A contracts to erect a building for C. B then contracts with A to supply
lumber needed for the building. C is an incidental beneficiary of B's promise,
and B is an incidental beneficiary of C's promise to pay A for the building.
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makes sense to infer from an "assurance" to such entrants third
party beneficiary rights necessary to vitalize that assurance.
Further, arguably those rights should vest to become safe from
mutual contract rescission or modification 14 once a particular
beneficiary has acted in substantial reliance thereon.
Bailey is clearly not this kind of case. Since the employees'
benefit is plainly incidental to the purposes of the decree, any
rights which accrue should never be safe from mutual modifica-
tion by the primary parties. Even if there is reliance on such
rights, that reliance is unreasonable. However, while such a con-
clusion would end the inquiry under traditional contract
analysis, by labelling the beneficiaries as "incidental," perhaps it
should not be conclusive in the context of antitrust consent de-
crees. Although incidental beneficiaries' rights should always be
subject to modification by mutual agreement of the parties,
perhaps plaintiffs such as those in Bailey should have the right to
enforce the contract until such change occurs.
Consider Illustration 16 to the Restatement (Second)'s section
133: "B contracts with A to buy a new car manufactured by C. C
is an incidental beneficiary, even though the promise can be
performed only if money is paid to C." Although the Illustration
does not say so, the justification lies in that C is designated only
as a matter of convenience; it could just as easily have been C's
competitors D, E, or F. 115 C should, of course, realize this, and
would be unjustified in banking on the performance. Further, C
should have no enforcement rights regardless of reliance be-
cause A is perfectly capable of vindicating his own rights. If he
wants to modify the contract, rescind it, or simply not enforce it,
he will presumably be making his decision in his own interest. If
we shift to the Bailey situation, however, we immediately note a
striking difference. The promisee Department of Justice may
not enforce its rights for reasons that have little to do with A's
decision to forgo them. The Department may not find out about
the breach; if it does, it may not be able to spare resources to
"4 Whether third party rights in such a situation should vest against a court ordered
modification of the decree, over the objection either of the third party or of one of the
primary parties, is another question. However, Swifi appears to foreclose this possibility,
so the point will not be further considered here. Interestingly enough, modification was
unsuccessfully sought in Bailey. United States v. Iowa Beef Processors, Inc., 1974 Trade
Gas. 75,014 (N.D. Iowa 1974), aff'd, 43 U.S.L.W. 3187 (U.S. Oct. 15, 1974).
115 The Illustration would be misleading if there was a reason why A wanted C, and
only C, to provide the car; for instance, if A is president of C and does not want to give
business to a competitor; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 134, Illustration 4.
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compel compliance. Since the government has no direct
pecuniary interest in enforcement, full exercise of its legal rights
may not be warranted by the costs incurred. Accordingly, there
may be good reason to permit even incidental third party ben-
eficiaries to seek enforcement of decrees. However, their en-
forcement rights are qualitatively different from those of in-
tended beneficiaries, since they are subject to being cut off by an
agreement between the consent decree parties modifying that
decree and perhaps even subject to a stipulation by the Depart-
ment of Justice to the court opposing a particular attempt to
enforce a decriee (which could be viewed as a tacit modi-
fication-breach by the decree defendant assented to by a know-
ing and intentional failure to act by the Department).
In summary, the contract notion of intent to benefit pro-
vides some assistance, but is far from conclusive. Decrees explic-
ity conferring rights on third parties should be recognized to do
so, the rights vesting in accordance with the normal rules. De-
crees which invite, expressly or by reasonable implication, sub-
stantial reliance on the terms of the decree by third parties
should also be viewed as creating third party rights which vest no
later than upon substantial reliance. In a departure from tradi-
tional contract analysis, however, even incidental beneficiaries
should be allowed to enforce consent decrees unless or until
there is an express or tacit modification.
D. The Advantages and Disadvantages
of the Third Party Enforcement
of Government Antitrust Consent Decrees
Despite the IBM decision, one would think that, from a pol-
icy standpoint, the most natural frame of mind in which to ap-
proach the question whether third parties ought to be able to en-
force consent decrees is not "Why so?" but rather "Why not?"
The decrees, after all, reflect the informed judgment of the Anti-
trust Division that their provisions will lead to a more competi-
tive economy in accordance with the policy of the antitrust laws.
Furthermore, the decrees have the imprimatur of a court as a
check upon the accuracy of the Division's judgment. 116 In such a
context, private party enforcement of consent decrees seems de-
116 It is true that the courts in practice rarely exercise independent judgment about
the appropriateness of the decrees they enter. Nevertheless, their existence as a screening
device may put some constraints on the terms of the final settlement.
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sirable since it would maximize enforcement of decrees by pro-
viding additional persons interested in obtaining compliance.
Indeed, the pecuniary motives of the third parties may well
make them more interested and effective than the Justice
Department. 117 Moreover, an increase in enforcement efforts by
third parties might enable the Antitrust Division to shift some of
its limited resources to other facets of its operations. This is not
to suggest that compliance can be left entirely to third parties
-there may well be situations where no one has a sufficient
economic motive to oversee enforcement, or industries where a
"don't-rock-the-boat" attitude makes third party enforcement
unlikely. Nevertheless, the net effect of permitting such en-
forcement should be greater compliance for less government
expenditures."
8
It may be in recognition of these kinds of considerations
that rule 71 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was ap-
proved: "When an order is made in favor of a person who is not
"17 The Department of Justice has itself recognized to a limited extent the utility of
involving interested parties in its compliance program as demonstrated by the provisions
often found in consent decrees requiring the defendants to notify customers or com-
petitors about the terms of such decrees. See Flynn, supra note 9, at 995. The purpose of
such provision is clearly to create a pool of potential informers among those most likely
to know about violations simply because they suffer from them. While useful as far as it
goes, this approach is too limited to achieve the gains which might be attained through
shifting the burden of enforcement to private parties by giving them direct enforcement
powers.
118 Although facilitating government enforcement has not often been a ground for
decision in private antitrust suits, there is at least one case where the court relied on this
notion to reach its result. In Simco Sales Serv. v. Air Reduction Co., 213 F. Supp. 505
(E.D. Pa. 1963), defendant moved to strike from plaintiff's antitrust complaint references
to a government consent decree and to the defendant's plea of guilty to criminal con-
tempt proceedings brought by the government for violation of that decree. The court
denied this motion on the ground that § 5(a) of the Clayton Act permitted the plaintiff to
use the guilty plea against the defendant. The court rejected the defendant's argument
that, because the contempt proceedings arose out of the original consent decree, which
was clearly within the proviso to § 5(a), the contempt conviction was also a "consent
proceeding":
In my opinion such an interpretation does violence to the Congressional policy
underlying the limited immunity granted by the proviso to § 5. The proviso was
inserted to "... . encourage defendants to submit to the demands of the govern-
ment." To extend the scope of the proviso to proceedings instituted to punish
violations of such consent decrees would be to encourage the very conduct which
the legislation was designed to eliminate. I cannot ascribe such a contradictory
intent to Congress.
213 F. Supp. at 507.
Though one may quarrel with the reasoning in Sirco on the ground that violation of
a decree is not necessarily a violation of the antitrust laws, see Note, supra note 9, the
case clearly rests on the judgment that private enforcement works in tandem with gov-
ernment efforts under the antitrust laws.
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a party to the action, he may enforce obedience to the order by
the same process as if he were a party .... ." The rule has been
invoked in a few cases to permit beneficiaries of government
obtained judgments to seek enforcement of those judgments, 119
although two attempts to employ it in the context of antitrust
consent decrees have failed.'
20
Against these obviously desirable effects a number of objec-
tions may be counterposed. Although several have been dis-
cussed previously, it will be useful to treat them all here in order
to put them in proper perspective. First of all, at least some
consent decrees may involve overreaching by the government,
and permitting private enforcement only maximizes this diffi-
culty. But, as we have pointed out,121 this problem is one which
is best approached directly, through review of the decrees them-
selves, rather than indirectly and inefficaciously by limiting the
persons who may seek enforcement.
Second, it may be objected that increased consent decree
enforcement will not necessarily further the substantive policies
of the antitrust laws. Consent decrees may be anticompetitive,
'"9 In United States v. Hackett, 123 F. Supp. 104 (W.D. Mo. 1954), the court had
previously awarded a judgment to the plaintiff United States "for and on behalf of"
certain individuals who were not plaintiffs for defendant's violations of rent control laws.
The individuals, not the United States, sought to execute on this judgment, and the
defendant moved to quash, arguing that only the United States could execute. The court,
relying on rule 71 and the phrasing "for and on behalf of," denied the motion.
Likewise, in Woods v. O'Brien, 78 F. Supp. 221 (D. Mass. 1948), the United States
had previously obtained a permanent injunction barring defendant from evicting one
Miller except in accordance with applicable federal law. Miller filed a petition for attach-
ment for defendant's contempt of this injunction under rule 71. The court, without
noticing any problem with the moving party, found the defendant in contempt, and
ordered $50 paid, $5 to the petitioner and the remaining $45 to the United States. See
also Robert Findlay Mfg. Co. v. Hygrade Lighting Fixture Corp., 288 F. 80 (E.D.N.Y.
1923); Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. Chicago & A. Ry. Co., 44 F. 653 (C.C.D. Indiana
1890) (reaching a similar result under old equity rule 11, the predecessor of rule 71).
120 United States v. American Soc'y of Composers, Authors & Ptiblishers, 341 F.2d
1003 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 877 (1965); United States v. Paramount Pictures,
Inc., 75 F. Supp. 1002 (S.D.N.Y. 1948). See notes 26, 27 & 38supra & accompanying text.
The courts rejected the contention on the ground that the orders were not made in favor
of the plaintiffs. Thus, the ASCAP court wrote: "Here, no order was made in Met-
romedia's favor. No monetary or other relief was specifically granted to Metrome-
dia-it was not even named in the judgment-and it is not enough to say that Met-
romedia was indirectly or economically benefitted by the decree." 341 F.2d at 1008.
Interestingly enough, this portion of the ASCAP opinion, much like that treated earlier,
see text accompanying notes 37-40 supra, implicitly leaves open the possibility that third
parties may have rights to enforce decrees. Further, since it is familiar third party be-
neficiary law that a beneficiary has rights only if the parties so contemplate, this decision
can be explained simply on the basis of no intention to create such rights.
121 See text accompanying note 51 supra.
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either ab initio because of the mistaken judgment of the Antitrust
Division, or because terms once procompetitive have become an-
ticompetitive through changed circumstances. This second objec-
tion ties in with a third, that private parties, precisely because
they seek to further their own pecuniary interests rather than
the public interest, may enforce anticompetitive provisions that
the Antitrust Division, in the exercise of enlightened prosecutor-
ial discretion, would not.
122
Several responses to these objections are possible. First, they
are applicable only to instances in which government nonen-
forcement reflects a considered Department of Justice decision
that continued compliance with the decree would be contrary to
the public interest. It has been suggested, however, that most
nonenforcement is attributable to a lack of resources rather than
to such a decision. 123 Just as we are often cautioned to avoid
equating automatically the protection of competitors with the
protection of competition, we should also eschew the equally
fallacious notion that one can never preserve competition by
protecting competitors. The interests of the public and of private
plaintiffs may coincide. It is the thesis of this Article that when
an initial determination of such coincidence has been made by
the Antitrust Division, accepted by a court of law, and incorpo-
rated into a final judgment, the decree beneficiaries should have
the power to enforce the provisions of the decree which run to
their benefit. Second, even granting that in some cases a com-
petitor may vigorously enforce an anticompetitive provision in a
consent decree, it does not necessarily follow that the third party
beneficiary theory ought to be rejected entirely. These situations
may be sufficiently rare that the disadvantages of enforcement in
such cases are greatly offset by the effects of increased com-
pliance with the more usual procompetitive decrees, although
admittedly this conclusion cannot be supported empirically at
this time. It is, therefore, necessary to turn to a third response to
these objections.
The possibility of increased enforcement of an anticompeti-
tive decree is a serious objection to recognizing third party ben-
eficiary rights only if such rights are unqualified and the decrees
are not subject to modification. Neither principle is urged here.
122 See generally Note, An Experiment in Preventive Anti-Trust: Judicial Regulation of the
Motion Picture Exhibition Market Under the Paramount Decrees, 74 YALE L.J. 1041 (1965).
123 See note 5 supra.
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Under current practice the two original parties to the decree
may, if convinced that its provisions have begun to have an-
ticompetitive consequences, agree to modify or end the decree,
an agreement which is almost certain to be approved by the
court. It is true that third party beneficiary law might impose
some obstacles to this method of change. However, while the two
parties to a contract can vest indefeasible rights in third party
beneficiaries, they can also make any rights subject to divestment
by mutual agreement. Like so many questions in the third party
beneficiary area, whether rights do vest is as matter of intent,
and it would usually be easy to find either an implied-by-custom,
or, in some cases, an express provision permitting the primary
parties to modify the decree. Accordingly, the courts could rec-
ognize third party beneficiary rights in a manner that would
leave Department of Justice prosecutorial discretion entirely un-
affected.
It has, however, been pointed out that in cases of substantial
and justifiable reliance by the beneficiaries perhaps such rights
ought to vest in the contract law sense of becoming immune
from mere mutual rescission. 124 With respect to future decrees,
the Department could avoid even this result by an express reser-
vation of the power to modify with the defendant's consent, but
as to past decrees, recognition of such rights would impinge on
prosecutorial discretion to some extent. It would not, however,
amount to giving the decree beneficiary a veto power over mod-
ifications sought by the Department in the public interest. As we
have seen, consent decrees are always subject to court ordered
modification at the petition of either party, even over the objec-
tion of the other, and, a fortiori, over the objection of a third
party beneficiary. 125 Therefore, recognizing vested third party
rights would simply give the decree beneficiary standing to in-
tervene to oppose the modification agreed to by the original
parties. 126 It might perhaps be suggested that this is undesirable
for two reasons: that litigating questions now resolved informally
would itself be a drain on government resources; and that judi-
cial review of Department decisions is undesirable. The first
124 See text accompanying note 114 supra.
125 See text accompanying notes 72-88 supra.
126 This was precisely the situation in which intervention was approved by the Su-
preme Court in Missouri-Kansas Pipe Line Co. v. United States, 312 U.S. 502 (1941),
although there the right of the decree beneficiary to intervene was expressly provided
for in the consent decree. See text accompanying notes 33-36 supra.
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problem is easily resolved. Since we are dealing with a situation
where, by definition, the government has determined that the
public interest is congruent with the interest of the defendant
seeking modification, the government need not take an active
role in the dispute. In most cases, the Department could simply
stipulate its agreement with the defendant's position and trust to
the defendant's economic self-interest to ensure adequate rep-
resentation of the common position in the dispute between the
private parties. Any drain on government resources, then, would
be negligible, and well worth the gains in increased compliance
generally upon which the third party beneficiary theory is predi-
cated.
The second problem, that of judicial review of the Depart-
ment's decision in the context of the dispute between the anti-
trust defendant and the decree beneficiary, is somewhat more
difficult, but is ultimately unconvincing as an objection to the
theory. To begin with, government resort to consent decrees
(which require court approval and a concomittant retention of
jurisdiction), rather than mere contract settlements, invites a real
judicial role. Second, while court deference to the Antitrust
Division's judgment is ordinarily appropriate in view of the
Division's expertise, it is much less compelling in the situation
involving two conflicting judgments: that in the original consent
decree and that in the supported modification. Third, by defini-
tion, the third party has relied on the original position in a
substantial and justifiable manner. The equities in favor of per-
mitting the beneficiary to argue the correctness of the original
decree, and the absence of any conditions warranting modifica-
tion, are obvious. Finally, the minimal impingement on the
Department's discretion can be justified in terms of the long-
range interest of antitrust enforcement, whatever the outcome in
a particular case, since allowing third parties such standing will
encourage their reliance on future consent decrees and thus
often enhance the effectiveness of such decrees. For example, in
the initial hypothetical, more leasing companies might come into
existence to compete with IBM in computer services if their
source of supply at nondiscriminatory prices were assured.
Another objection to third party enforcement is that differ-
ent, possibly conflicting interpretations of the consent decree by
different courts with juridiction over third party beneficiary
claims may play havoc with the purposes of the decree. This is a
substantial problem since there is a possibility either that the
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decree will be interpreted inconsistently with its purposes, or
that a defendant will be subjected to conflicting interpretations
of its obligations by different courts. 127
127 The question of which courts will have subject matter jurisdiction over the third
party beneficiary claim is a thorny one, but we must recognize the possibility that the
state courts and the federal district courts will all be able to assert jurisdiction over such
claims.
There are five possible distinct bases for subject matterjurisdiction over a third party
beneficiary cause of action deriving from a government antitrust consent decree. The
first is the general jurisdiction of the state courts since they are not barred by the
exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts. Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15
(1970), provides for such exclusive jurisdiction only with respect to suits for injuries "by
reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws"; the suit contemplated would be for
breach of contract, not for violation of the antitrust laws. A second basis for jurisdiction is
that of the federal courts in a diversity action. Neither of these bases poses problems
peculiar to our study, and therefore we will not consider them further. A third jurisdic-
tional basis, the notion that such a suit arises under the federal common law is discussed
above. See note 89 supra. Presumably a matter arising under federal common law is a
federal question within the original jurisdiction of the federal district courts under 28
U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1970). Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972). See also Farkas
v. Texas Instruments, Inc., 375 F.2d 629 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 977 (1967);
Farmer v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 329 F.2d 3 (3d Cir. 1964).
The remaining two bases for federal court jurisdiction, pendent and ancillary, re-
quire further elaboration here. The statutory foundation for pendent jurisdiction, 28
U.S.C. § 1338(b) (1970), is so limited in scope as to be of no assistance to us. However,
§ 1338(b) is itself merely a particular statutory formulation of a more general judicially
established principle, one enunciated by the Supreme Court most famously in Hurn v.
Oursler, 289 U.S. 238 (1933), and, more recently, in United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383
U.S. 715 (1966). See Note, UMW v. Gibbs and Pendent Jurisdiction, 81 HARV. L. REV. 657
(1968). The principle is that, given a substantial federal claim and a state claim with the
requisite nexus to the federal claim, a federal court with jurisdiction over the federal
claim may in its discretion decide the state claim without regard to whether it decides in
favor of the plaintiff on the federal claim. Without attempting to plumb too deeply the
mysteries of either "substantiality" or the nexus requirement, we should note that pen-
dent jurisdiction over the third party beneficiary claim will exist in at least some cases if
the claim is brought in conjunction with an antitrust suit. For example, let us reconsider
our hypothetical version of DPF&G's complaint in Control Data Corp. v. International
Business Mach. Corp., text accompanying note 1 supra. The federal antitrust cause of
action alleged was monopolization, the elements of which are monopoly and an abuse of
that monopoly. If we grant that DPF&G has at least an arguable case concerning IBM's
monopoly power, one abuse which plaintiff could claim was that IBM engaged in leasing
rather than selling its products. See United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F.
Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953), aff'd per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954). This is, of course, the
very conduct barred by the consent decree. Accordingly, the DPF&G claims under fed-
eral law and under state law would satisfy the Gibbs test as deriving from a "common
nucleus of operative fact." If the antitrust claim foundered, either because IBM was not a
monopoly or because leasing was not, in this context, an abuse, the contract claim would
remain viable. However, while pendent jurisdiction in many cases may offer a basis for
discretionary exercise of federal court jurisdiction, the requirement of a substantial fed-
eral claim will significantly diminish the utility of the third party beneficiary claim. For
many plaintiffs, the chief advantage of suing for breach of contract is the avoidance of
the complex litigation involved in asserting legitimate antitrust claims.
The fifth possible jurisdictional basis is ancillary jurisdiction, which has been de-
scribed as follows:
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Such difficulties troubled the court in New Jersey Communica-
tions Corp. v. American Telephone and Telegraph Co. 128 where the
plaintiffs petitioned the Southern District of New York to en-
This concept, which is buttressed on the premise that ancillary jurisdiction is
essential to the efficiency, independence, and self-sufficiency of the federal judi-
cial system, enables the federal courts to adjudicate controversies related to or
dependent on the principal action which if brought independently would be
outside the court's jurisdiction or barred for lack of proper venue. In its
broadest sense, the concept of ancillary jurisdiction encompasses proceedings
which have a direct relation to property or assets drawn into the control or
custody of the court by the original action, or which arise from the same set of
operative facts upon which the principal proceeding was grounded.
Note, AncillaTy Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 48 IOWA L. REV. 383, 383-84 (1963)
(footnotes omitted). Unfortunately, the parameters of the doctrine, except for situations
in which a res has come into the control or custody of a court, are not well-defined. See,
Note, The Ancillary Concept and the Federal Rules, 64 HARV L. REV. 968 (1951). As the court
in Walmac Co. v. Isaacs, 220 F.2d 108, 113-14 (1st Cir. 1955), stated:
The doctrine of dependent or ancillary jurisdiction is not capable of exact defin-
ition. At least so far as we are aware no court has ever tried to fix its limits with
any degree of precision. It springs from the equitable doctrine that a court with
jurisdiction of a case may consider therein subject matter over which it would
have no independent jurisdiction whenever such matter must be considered in
order to do full justice.
The question at issue, then, is simply whether a federal district court which has
jurisdiction over a consent decree has ancillary jurisdiction over a contract suit brought to
remedy a breach of that decree, without regard to whether the plaintiff also alleges an
antitrust cause of action. Involved in this question are two subsidiary questions: Is a
contract suit on a consent decree "ancillary" to that decree? and, Is ancillary jurisdiction
precluded when a nonparty to the principal proceeding seeks to invoke the jurisdiction
of the court? On neither point may a definitive answer be found. Nevertheless, it is
arguable that such a suit could be brought. If, for example, the government chose to sue
the defendant for breach of contract for violation of the consent decree, such a suit
would grow out of the consent decree itself and therefore should be within the jurisdic-
tion of the court which entered the decree under the well-established principle that a
court has ancillary jurisdiction "to include those acts which the federal court must take in
order properly to effectuate its judgment on a matter as to which it has jurisdiction." W.
BARRON & A. HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURES WITH FotsS § 23, at 95 (C.
Wright rev. 1960). And it is not clear why this language and the principle it expresses
ought not to be extended to persons not parties to the original action but who have a
right arising from the agreement settling it. Nevertheless, the cases at most seem to
establish ancillary jurisdiction over what might be described as ancillary defendants; they
do not yet establish the status of ancillary plaintiff. See, e.g., C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1444 (1971); cf. Note, Federal Pendent Subject Matter
Jurisdiction--the Doctrine of United Mine Workers v. Gibbs Extended to Persons Not Party to the
Jurisdiction-Conferring Claim, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 153 (1973).
128 1968 Trade Cas. 72,455 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). See also United States v. United States
Gypsum Co., 124 F. Supp. 573 (D.D.C. 1954), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. United States
Gypsum Co. v. National Gypsum Co., 352 U.S. 457 (1957). The Gypsum court found as a
reason for assuming jurisdiction over a petition by several codefendants seeking to en-
force a final judgment against their codefendant to bar it from suing them in other
courts, see text accompanying notes 28 & 29 supra, the fact that the decree would be
subject to possible misconstruction by the state courts if the petitioner raised it as a
defense in those suits. 124 F. Supp. at 582. The Supreme Court's decision explicitly
approved the exercise of jurisdiction on this ground, among others. 352 U.S. at 464.
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force an antitrust consent decree entered by the District Court
for New Jersey by seeking both an injunction and a contempt
citation. 129 Jurisdiction was asserted on the basis of a federal
question arising out of the decree. t 30 The court, after stating
that plaintiff could either bring an independent treble damage
suit or seek to intervene in the original action, then turned to the
plaintiffs' attempt to seek enforcement of the decree in another
court:
We hold that this action must be dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter. For this Court to
undertake to decide whether a defendant named in an
action filed in another District Court was guilty of a
violation of the provisions of a final judgment entered
in that action, and if found to be guilty, to undertake to
fix and impose just punitive measures, would be an im-
pertinent and unjustifiable intrusion on the jurisdiction
of the other Court. Such a course, if pursued, would
lead to confusion as to the construction to be placed
upon the final judgment, a multitude of independent
proceedings in numerous jurisdictions, and would de-
feat the very purposes of the final judgment. 3'
At least two observations should be made with respect to this
reasoning. It suggests, at most, that enforcement by third parties
be limited to the district court which entered the decree. It does
not reject third party enforcement entirely. Further, such defer-
ence is especially appropriate in cases such as New Jersey
Communications where the plaintiff had only to cross the Hudson
to be in the appropriate court. Accordingly, the opinion is not
authority for a general rule that, regardless of hardship to the
plaintiff, a federal district court will not enforce a consent decree
issued by another such court.
32
Second, the result reached in that case is by no means in-
129 -The judgment in question did not qualify as one which could be registered in the
Southern District of New York and thereafter enforced in like manner as in the issuing
jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1963 (1970). See generally WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 127,
§ 2787. Of course even if § 1963 were to govern, it would not be clear whether any
person other than the one who obtained the original judgment could register it.
130 See note 89 supra.
1' 1968 Trade Cas. 72,455, at 85,447-48.
132 To the extent that jurisdiction is predicated solely on the ancillary theory, see note
127 supra, the problem of enforcement by a different court does not arise: by definition
the action will be brought in the court which issued the consent decree. However, under
any other possible basis for jurisdiction, the problem of different courts dealing with the
same decree is present.
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evitable. In at least two recent subsequent cases the same district
court which decided New Jersey Communications indicated that the
interpretation of a consent decree of another district court
"would not seem to pose insurmountable difficulties."'133 And
Bailey v. Iowa Beef Processors, Inc. 134 rejected the theory that the
federal district court had exclusive jurisdiction over the consent
decree it issued, 135 and went on to interpret the decree to de-
termine if it did in fact create third party beneficiary rights. In
many situations, as in Bailey, the actual probability of conflicting
interpretations of the consent decree will be minimal. At most,
then, this difficulty suggests a discretionary decision on the part
of the court which is asked to enforce a consent decree issued
elsewhere, a discretion which should be exercised in the light of
such factors as the ease and efficacy of plaintiff's resort to the
issuing court, and the possibility and seriousness of conflict.
To summarize, there are strong policy arguments favoring
the creation of a third party beneficiary right of action. And,
while some of the objections to such recovery are not without
substance, it seems possible to resolve the problems they raise by
tailoring the contours of the legal right to be recognized rather
than rejecting the notion out of hand.
III. POSTJUDGMENT INTERVENTION
At one point in his opinion in Control Data Corp. v. Interna-
tional Business Machines Corp.,3 6 Judge Neville referred to the
133 Berkey Photo Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 1974 Trade Cas. 74,882, at 95,977
(S.D.N.Y. 1974); City of New York v. General Motors Corp., 357 F. Supp. 327, 329
(S.D.N.Y. 1973). Each case involved an attempt by the defendant to transfer a private
antitrust suit from the district in which it was brought to the district court which issued
the government consent decree.
134 213 N.W.2d 642 (Iowa 1973), cert. denied, 95 S. Ct. 52 (1974).
135 The trial court in Bailey dismissed the complaint on the ground that the federal
court had retained exclusive jurisdiction for enforcement of the consent decree. The
Iowa Supreme Court rejected this theory because "[A] provision for retention of jurisdic-
tion is effective in accordance with its wording," and the wording of the decree allowed
retention "for the purpose of enabling any of the parties to this Final Judgment to apply"
to the federal court for further orders. Since the present plaintiffs were not parties to
that suit, the Iowa Supreme Court concluded that the federal court's retained jurisdiction
did not extend to them. Id. at 644.
This reasoning is overly simplistic. On the one hand, it would be easy enough either
to read the jurisdiction clause as implicitly including all ancillary matters, or to find that
the district court had inherent jurisdiction. See note 127 supra. But, on the other hand, it
is not clear why either trial or supreme court thought that, if there were federal jurisdic-
tion, it had to be exclusive.
136 306 F. Supp. 839 (D. Minn. 1969), aff'd sub nom. Data Processing Financial &
General Corp. v. International Business Mach. Corp., 430 F.2d 1277 (8th Cir. 1970).
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then recent Supreme Court decision in Cascade Natural Gas Corp.
v. El Paso Natural Gas Co. 1 37 as permitting intervention by in-
terested third parties prior to the finalization of the decree in a
government antitrust suit. He then wrote:
Such would indicate that if these plaintiffs believe they
have a right to enforce either the 1935 [litigated] or the
1956 [consent] decrees, they should petition the Federal
District Court for the Southern District of New York
accordingly. On the question as to whether they would
be permitted some 34 and 13 years later to intervene
or to assert claims, this court does not express an
opinion. 138
In order to assess the feasibility of intervention as of right1 39 as
an alternative to the third party beneficiary theory discussed, it is
necessary to tread where Judge Neville held back and explore
the availability of postjudgment intervention.
Before undertaking this consideration, however, two caveats
are necessary. First, intervention, even if available of right, may
not be a perfect substitute for third party beneficiary recovery
because of possibly differing remedies. There is no difficulty
with respect to equitable relief, since a successful intervenor
could, as a party, employ the contempt sanction to compel
defendant's compliance 40 and obtain an injunction against con-
duct within the purpose of the decree.' 4' The effect would be
the functional equivalent of an order of specific performance
emanating from a contract suit. But a problem does exist with
respect to damages. If these are not required by the court as a
condition for purging the defendant of contempt, 142 they can
only be awarded on a third party beneficiary theory. Neverthe-
less, the power to compel compliance will often be valuable even
absent a concomitant right to damages. Accordingly, it is worth-
while to explore postjudgment intervention as an alternative to
the contract theory earlier considered.
137 386 U.S. 129 (1967).
138 306 F. Supp. at 845.
139 Intervention by permission of the court may also be available, perhaps on less
stringent terms, FED. R. Civ. P. 24(b), but it offers too uncertain a route to vindicate the
policy interests underlying the recognition of enforcement powers in third parties with
respect to government antitrust decrees.
140 See Terminal R.R. Ass'n v. United States, 266 U.S. 17 (1924).
141 See United States Gypsum Co. v. National Gypsum Co., 352 U.S. 457 (1957).
142 See, e.g., McComb v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 336 U.S. 187 (1949).
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Second, the restricted scope of the present inquiry must be
stressed. No attempt is made to treat thoroughly the whole con-
cept of intervention, 143 or even the somewhat more limited ques-
tion of the general propriety of intervention in antitrust cases.
1 44
Rather, the focus of this portion of the Article is on the narrow
issue of the availability of postjudgment intervention in govern-
ment antitrust suits solely for the purpose of enforcing that
judgment. This limitation is critical since, as we shall see, many
of the policy reasons cutting against a general expansion of in-
tervention are inapplicable to intervention at this stage for such
a purpose.
The starting point for any consideration of intervention
must be, of course, rule 24(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, which provides:
(a) Intervention of Right. Upon timely application any-
one shall be permitted to intervene in an action: ... (2)
when the applicant claims an interest relating to the
property or transaction which is the subject of the ac-
tion and he is so situated that the disposition of the
action may as a practical matter impair or impede his
ability to protect that interest, unless the applicant's in-
terest is adequately represented by existing parties.
The simplicity of this formulation is deceptive, for it conceals
intractable problems involved in determining whether the ap-
plicant has a cognizable "interest," ascertaining if that interest is
"impaired or impeded," and deciding whether the existing par-
ties "adequately represent" it.
To pose these problems in the setting in which we are in-
terested, let us return to our original scenario. There the decree
beneficiaries' concern about IBM compliance with the judgment
is understandable since, as purchasers, they have a strong
economic interest in buying IBM equipment at the lowest price.
143 See, e.g., Kennedy, Let's All Join In: Intervention Under Federal Rule 24, 57 Ky. L.J.
329 (1969); Shapiro, Some Thoughts on Intervention Before Courts, Agencies, and Arbitrators,
81 HARV. L. REv. 721 (1968).
144 See, e.g., Buxbaum, Public Participation in the Enforcement of the Antitrust Laws, 59
CALiF. L. REv. 1113 (1971); Handler, The Shift from Substantive to Procedural Innovations in
Antitrust Suits-The Twenty-Third Annual Antitrust Review, 71 COLuM. L. REv. 1, 17-23
(1971); Comment, The Automobile Pollution Case: Intervention in Consent Decree Settlement, 5
HARV. Civ. RIGHTS-CIv. LIB. L. REv. 408 (1970). There is also a developing body of
literature on the subject of intervention before administrative agencies which may pro-
vide useful analogies for considering intervention in government antitrust suits. See, e.g.,
Gellhorn, Public Participation in Administrative Proceedings, 81 YALE L.J. 359 (1972).
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But is this "interest" the kind which satisfies rule 24(a)(2)? Al-
though any applicant willing to incur attorneys' fees in seeking to
intervene has thereby demonstrated his interest in the litigation,
the rule may contemplate a more stringent test. Another prob-
lem arises with the applicant's interest being "impaired or im-
peded." To the extent that IBM's conduct is susceptible of attack
under the antitrust laws, is the would-be intervenor's interest
sufficiently protected by this remedy? Or should the decision
turn on the difficulty of the applicant establishing an antitrust
violation? For example, intervention might be denied where the
government's act was directed at per se offenses, but permitted
where the rule of reason governed. Finally, assuming both an
interest and its impairment, there remains the problem of de-
termining whether the government's representation is adequate.
Does the failure of the Justice Department to enforce the decree
establish inadequacy, or is something more required?
Unfortunately, there is a dearth of authority on point. Only
one decision has been discovered on whether a private party who
is the beneficiary of a decree in a government antitrust suit may
intervene to seek enforcement. In United States v. Western
Electric145 the District Court for the District of New Jersey denied
intervention, and the Supreme Court affirmed without opinion.
In order to assess the implications of this decision, two questions
must be considered: whether, as a matter of precedent, the Su-
preme Court's affirmance elevates Western Electric to the status of
binding authority;1 46 and the correctness of the district court's
decision on the merits.
The first question need not delay us long since it seems
recognized that such affirmance means little. As one commen-
tator wrote:
The Supreme Court's use of the straightforward affir-
mance in these direct appeals rather than dismissal for
want of a substantial federal question does not indicate
that the general issue of the propriety of allowing inter-
141 1968 Trade Cas. 72,415 (D.N.J. 1968), aff'd mem. sub nom. Clark Walter & Sons,
Inc. v. United States, 392 U.S. 659 (1968).
146 Even if Western Electric is binding authority on intervention to enforce a consent
decree, it does not hold on the question of intervention under a litigated decree. That the
difference may warrant a legal distinction is clear from both of the district court's reasons
for its decision. One basis was that allowing intervention would reduce defendant incen-
tive to consent; obviously this has no application to a decree entered after litigation. The
second justification, the "flood of intervenors" argument, has a much reduced impact
with respect to intervention under litigated decrees since these constitute only a small
portion of the judgments obtained by the Department of Justice. See note 11 supra.
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vention, as opposed to the essentially judgmental issue
of allowing intervention in a particular case, has been
reviewed in any meaningful sense by the Court.
47
The second question, the correctness of the decision on the
merits, is more difficult. The applicants for intervention alleged
that the defendants were furnishing communications equipment
to hospitals in violation of the consent decree settling the
government's antitrust suit. The district judge conceded the vio-
lation on the basis of the facts before him but denied interven-
tion on the grounds that enforcement of consent decrees by
nonparties would discourage defendants from consenting to
them and that to allow intervention would result in "a volume of
litigation that would be almost impossible for the Court to
handle."
The parallel between this reasoning and that in IBM is strik-
ing, although Judge Neville's opinion is more elegant and more
elaborate. Nevertheless, the opinions share the same fallacies
that need not be reconsidered at length. We have already seen
that there is no public interest in encouraging defendants to
enter into consent decrees they do not intend to obey. 48 And
with respect to the flood of litigation argument, the same factors
that rendered the contention unconvincing in the third party
beneficiary context are also applicable in the intervention
setting. 149
While the rationale of Western Electric is unpersuasive,
perhaps the result can be justified. In order to determine this,
we must consider the decision in the light of the precedents
interpreting rule 24(a). In undertaking this task, we must begin
by sharply differentiating the state of the law before and after
1967, the year the Supreme Court decided Cascade Natural Gas
Co. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co. 150 The law prior to Cascade can be
simply summarized: intervention of right by private persons in
government antitrust suits was greatly disfavored. 151 Whether
147 Buxbaum, supra note 143, at 1132-33 n.82. The Supreme Court itself is not
disposed to put much weight on an affirmance without opinion. In Cascade Natural Gas
Corp. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 386 U.S. 129 (1967), the dissent cited a number of such
decisions which the majority ignored in reaching its conclusion. See note 151 infra.
148 See text accompanying note 44 supra.
1
49 See text accompanying notes 43 supra & 192 infra.
150 386 U.S. 129 (1967). The decision was 5-2, with Justices Harlan and Stewart
dissenting. Justices Fortas and White did not participate.
151 Mr. Justice Stewart, joined by Mr. Justice Harlan, dissented in Cascade, and
characterized the majority decision as. being a radical change: "The Court's decision not
only overturns established general principles of intervention, but ... also repudiates a
1975]
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 123:822
and to what extent Cascade may have altered this attitude are
questions to which we now turn.
Cascade grew out of a suit by the United States to enjoin the
acquisition by El Paso Natural Gas of Pacific Northwest Pipeline.
In an earlier decision the Court had found the acquisition in
violation of section 7 of the Clayton Act, and it remanded with
directions to the district court to order divestiture. 15 2 The Justice
Department and the defendant agreed on the provisions of the
divestiture decree, which was then approved by the district
court. At this point several applicants sought to intervene to
protect interests which they saw endangered by the decree.
These included California (which wanted Pacific Northwest re-
stored as a substantial competitor in the state), Southern Califor-
nia Edison (a large purchaser of natural gas from El Paso
sources which wanted to restore competition in California), and
Cascade Natural Gas (a distributor whose sole supplier had been
Pacific Northwest and would be the new company established by
the divestiture). The district court denied all applications for
intervention, and the would-be intervenors appealed.
The Court's decision is somewhat complicated by the fact
that when the district court denied the motions to intervene old
large and long-established body of decisions specifically, and correctly, denying interven-
tion in government antitrust litigation." 386 U.S. at 147. In support of this statement, the
dissent cites some eight Supreme Court decisions denying intervention, with only two
decisions, both of which it distinguishes, in support of it. While strictly speaking this is
accurate, the cited authority is perhaps more probative of a climate hostile to intervention
than a carefully articulated doctrine disallowing it in government antitrust cases. Of the
eight anti-intervention cases cited, six were decisions without opinion: Bardy v. United
States, 371 U.S. 576 (1963); Westinghouse Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 364 U.S.
518 (1960); Wometco Television & Theatre Co. v. United States, 355 U.S. 40 (1957);
Partmar Corp. v. United States, 338 U.S. 804 (1949); Ball v. United States, 338 U.S. 802
(1949); Ex Parte Leaf Tobacco Bd., 222 U.S. 578 (1911). Of the four cases dealing with
intervention in full opinions, two permitted intervention: Missouri-Kansas Pipe Line Co.
v. United States, 312 U.S. 502 (1941); United States v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 236 U.S.
194 (1915); and two denied it: Sam Fox Publishing Co. v. United States, 366 U.S. 683
(1961); Allen Calculators, Inc. v. National Cash Register Co., 322 U.S. 137 (1944). And
even if, as Stewart contends, the two "pro" cases supported a right of intervention only in
limited circumstances, a similar objection can be made to one of the "con" cases. Sam Fox
denied intervention only under one possible branch of the rule then governing it (admit-
tedly, however, Sam Fox contains language broadly hostile to intervention in government
antitrust suits). Stewart's dissent buttresses its citations to government antitrust cases with
authority in other contexts which points in much the same direction. In sum, we can
perhaps agree with the dissent that Cascade marks a change in direction while reserving
judgment on the firmness and consistency of the previous approach. In any event, in
view both of the majority opinion and the textual changes made by the 1966 amend-
ments to rule 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governing intervention, no
exhaustive treatment of the prior authority is warranted.
1S2 United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651 (1964).
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rule 24(a)153 controlled, but by the time the case was argued
before the Supreme Court the present version of the rule had
become effective. The Court ultimately held that California and
Southern California Edison were entitled to intervene under old
rule 24(a)(3) as parties so "geographically situated" as to be "ad-
versely affected" by the district court's disposition of the
defendant's assets through the divestiture. It also held that Cas-
cade had an "interest" that the disposition of the action might
impede its ability to protect within new rule 24(a)(2).
154
Both branches of the Court's decision are relevant to our
inquiry, but that portion allowing intervention under new rule
24(a) is of the greater interest because it constitutes an applica-
tion of the presently governing standard. On this aspect, unfor-
tunately, the majority opinion is conclusory rather than analytic.
Read most broadly, this branch of Cascade can be said to establish
that a would-be intervenor in a government antitrust suit has a
cognizable "interest" whenever he has a substantial economic
stake in the outcome. 155 Such an interpretation can be supported
by the comments of the Advisory Committee responsible for
drafting new rule 24(a). The committee wrote, in language
which was italicized by the majority opinion in Cascade:'
56
If an absentee would be substantially affected in a prac-
tical sense by the determination made in an action, he
,-3 FED. R. Civ. P. 24:
(a) Intervention of Right. Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to
intervene in an action... (2) when the representation of the applicant's interest
by existing parties is or may be inadequate and the applicant is or may be bound
by a judgment in the action; or (3) when the applicant is so situated as to be
adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property which is in
the custody or subject to the control or disposition of the court or an officer
thereof.
,4 The Court justified applying the new rule to Cascade's application on the ground
that the rule governs further proceedings in pending actions: "Since the entire merits of
the case must be reopened to give California and Southern California Edison an oppor-
tunity to be heard as of right as intervenors, we conclude that new Rule 24(a)(2) is broad
enough to include Cascade also .... " 386 U.S. at 136.
,' This approach was a fairly radical departure from the prior case law under old
rule 24(a)(2) which, unlike old rule 24(a)(3), did speak in terms of the applicant's "in-
terest." See note 153 supra. The cases interpreting the provisions usually found a property
interest required, although there was some flexibility even here. E.g., Cascade, 386 U.S. at
145-56 (Stewart, J., dissenting); 3B MooRE, supra note 89, 24.09-1[2]; Note, Intervention
of Right Granted Private Party in Government Antitrust Suit under New Rule 24(a)(2), 1968
DUKE L.J. 117, 120-22 & nn.26-36. See also Shapiro, supra note 142, at 729-40, who
suggests that no coherent principle on the meaning of "interest" can be extracted from
the pre-Cascade cases.
,56 386 U.S. at 134 n.3.
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should, as a general rule, be entitled to intervene, and
his right to do so should not depend on whether there
is a fund to be distributed or otherwise disposed of.'5 7
But -whether such a broad reading will in fact become the ac-
cepted interpretation of Cascade remains unclear. Although some
commentators have approved this approach, 58 others have at-
tempted to limit such a reading, 59 and, generally, the lower
courts have not accorded Cascade the deference one would nor-
mally expect for a recent Supreme Court decision; at least two
have already described the case as sui generis. 60
Accordingly, we cannot say with certainty whether a com-
petitor or customer seeking to intervene to compel compliance
with the judgment in an antitrust action will be held to satisfy the
threshold interest criterion under rule 24(a). It does seem likely,
however, that the stronger the applicant's economic stake, the
more probable it is that an interest will be found. 1  Thus, if
157 The notes of the Advisory Committee on the 1966 amendments to rule 24 are
reprinted in 3B MOORE, supra note 89, 24.01 [10].
155 One noted authority wrote:
It is harder to criticize the Cascade decision for its understanding of the
concept of "interest."... As one lower court judge has noted, "though Cascade's
interest in the decree may have been somewhat remote, it did show a strong,
direct economic interest, for the new company would be its sole supplier." Cas-
cade seems to have had an important interest in seeing that the decree made its
sole supplier an economically feasible enterprise and the formulation of the
decree in this case was the only forum in which that interest could be asserted.
Thus, unless this interest were being adequately represented by the United
States, the holding that Cascade could intervene seems soundly based.
7A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 127, § 1908, at 499-500 (footnote omitted). This also
seems to be the thrust of the comments of another noted authority. Kaplan, Continuing
Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (I), 81
HARV. L. REV. 356, 405-06 (1967). See also Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir.
1969); Shapiro, supra note 143; Note, The Supreme Court 1966 Term, 81 HARV. L. REV. 69,
221 (1967).
159 E.g., Note, supra note 158, at 224-25, focusing on the fact that Cascade had a
substantial economic interest and its interest was consistent with the position that the
government should have taken. But as to the consistency of Cascade's interest and the
public interest, see Note, supra note 155, at 128-29.
160 United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 333 F. Supp. 1100, 1102 (S.D.N.Y.),
aff'd mem. sub nom. Syufy Enterprises v. United States, 404 U.S. 802 (1971); United States
v. Automobile Mfrs. Ass'n, 307 F. Supp. 617, 619 n.3 (C.D. Cal. 1969),aff'dper curiam sub
nom. City of New York v. United States, 397 U.S. 248 (1970).
161 That such a strong economic stake is necessary (if not sufficient) seems likely
since there are indications that the court will not look with favor on persons merely
asserting their interest in being "vicarious avengers" of the public interest. United States
v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 349 F. Supp. 22 (D. Conn. 1972), aff'd mem. sub nom.
Nader v. United States, 410 U.S. 919 (1973).
See also Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972); United States v. Blue Chip
Stamp Co., 272 F. Supp. 432 (C.D. Cal. 1967), aff'd per curiam sub nom. Thrifty Shoppers
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intervention had been sought by DPF&G in the IBM case on the
ground that IBM's pricing changes threatened the applicant's
existence, Cascade strongly militates for a finding of the requisite
"interest." If, then, at least some would-be intervenors will be
able to leap this first hurdle, the question becomes whether the
remaining two prerequisites can be met: whether the disposition
of the action will "impair or impede" the protection of the in-
terest, and whether the government's representation is inade-
quate.
On the former point the first branch of the Cascade decision
dealing with intervention under old rule 24(a)(3) is at least indi-
rectly relevant. That provision allowed intervention by an ap-
plicant "so situated as to be adversely affected" by disposition of
property within the court's control. 162 Since the district court
had control of the assets to be divested, 63 the only question was
whether California and Southern California Edison might be
adversely affected. Prior law had not gone as far as to find such
effects for "applicants who, like those in [Cascade], were affected
in the sense that they shared with buyers the concern that com-
petitive rivalry be maintained."'164 Yet this seems quite close to
the result actually reached in Cascade. Indeed, the only limitation
the Court suggested on such an expansive rule was that the
interests of the would-be intervenor must be "at the heart of the
controversy" in the government suit,165 and there was even a
suggestion of the application of a broader test than even that
Scrip Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 580, rehearing denied, 390 U.S. 975 (1968). This
litigation has continued. Manor Drug Stores v. Blue Chip Stamps, 492 F.2d 136 (9th Cir.
1973), cert. granted, 95 S. Ct. 302 (1974).
162 See note 153 supra.
163 Even had old rule 24(a)(3) continued in effect, instead of being superseded by
new rule 24(a)(2), Cascade would have had limited impact since old 24(a)(3) governed
only cases where the court had control or custody of property the disposition of which
would adversely affect the intervenor. Cascade, which involved the disposition of merged
assets, is the exceptional antitrust case. But see 3B MOORE, supra note 89, 24.09[2]
(suggesting that the control requirement was liberally construed).
164 Kaplan, supra note 158, at 404.
165 The Court looked to Missouri-Kansas Pipe Line Co. v. United States, 312 U.S.
502 (1941), and read it as holding that intervention is permissible when the applicant's
interests are at "the heart of the controversy" in the government suit. Id. at 506. The
Cascade majority, however, ignored a readily distinguishable feature of Pipe Line-the
consent decree there explicitly provided for Panhandle's becoming a party to enforce the
rights conferred by the decree. See text accompanying notes 35 & 36 supra. That this
factor was critical to the Pipe Line decision is clear both from Pipe Line itself where the
Court stated that for this reason, "the codification of general doctrines of intervention
contained in Rule 24(a) does not touch our problem," 312 U.S. at 508, and from the
Court's use of Pipe Line in its subsequent decision in Allen Calculators, Inc. v. National
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somewhat nebulous standard. 166 However, even if it is true that
the Supreme Court adopted a very broad reading of "adversely
affected" under old rule 24(a)(3), a question remains about the
import of this for cases now governed by new rule 24(a)(2). That
provision, it will be recalled, does not deal with adverse effects of
a court's disposition of property, but, rather, authorizes inter-
vention when the disposition of the action "may as a practical
matter impair or impede [the applicant's] ability to protect" a
particular "interest." If the Court's interpretation of "adversely
affected" under the old rule can be equated with "impeding or
impairing" an applicant's ability to protect his interest under the
new rule, Cascade has broad implications: any adverse effects on
a competitor or customer would suffice. Indeed, the only re-
maining bar of any significance to intervention in government
antitrust suits would be the requirement in rule 24(a)(2) that
representation by the government be inadequate.
There are, however, good reasons to believe that Cascade will
not be read quite so broadly. Although one could argue that
"impair or impede" is a lesser included category within "ad-
versely affected," so that the old rule 24(a)(3) branch of Cascade
is a fortiori determinative of new rule 24(a)(2) cases, such a con-
tention ignores the different settings of two tests. Old rule
24(a)(3) required only that the applicant be adversely affected by
the disposition of property. Even if Cascade holds that any
beneficiary of the increased competition flowing from a restruc-
turing of the market is adversely affected by less than optimum
divestiture, it would not be conclusive in a case decided under
Cash Register Co., 322 U.S. 137, 141 (1944). The failure of-the Cascade Court to advert to
this distinction, in the face of the dissent's emphasis on it, 386 U.S. at 151 n. 16, suggests a
deliberate attempt to broaden the Pipe Line rule.
166 At one point the majority wrote:
Apart from that [i.e., being at the heart of the controversy] but in the spirit of Pipe
Line Co. we think that California and Southern California Edison qualify as
intervenors under Rule 24(a)(3). Certainly these two appellants are "so situated"
geographically as to be "adversely affected" within the meaning of Rule 24(a)(3)
by a merger that reduces the competitive factor in natural gas available to
Californians.
386 U.S. at 135 (emphasis added). If this does constitute a more liberal test than "heart of
the controversy" for permitting intervention, it is not clear whether it constitutes holding
or dictum since the Court had apparently already held that California's interest in a
competitive system was at the heart of the controversy when it noted these interests were
"at the heart of our [prior] mandate directing divestiture." Id. at 135. Thus, any sugges-
tion that California also satisfied another-perhaps less rigid-test is dictum. However,
the Court also held that Southern California Edison had a right to intervene, and it is not
clear whether the decision with respect to this applicant was founded on a less rigorous
standard enunciated or merely on a judgment that it, too, was at the heart of the
controversy.
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new rule 24(a)(2). That provision requires that the applicant's
"ability to protect" his interest be impaired or impeded by the
disposition of the action in which he seeks to intervene. This
clearly shifts the focus from the consequences of a particular
action considered alone to an examination of the whole spec-
trum of legal remedies available to the would-be intervenor.
Perhaps only after concluding that the alternatives to interven-
tion are inadequate in some sense may the court decide that
denial of the application will impair or impede the would-be
intervenor's ability to protect his interest.
167
Curiously enough, the first branch of Cascade, though de-
cided under old rule 24(a)(3), can be explained in these terms.
Mergers, such as that at issue in the government suit, have tradi-
tionally been difficult for private parties to attack: damages may
be too speculative to recover, 168 and the availability of divestiture
as a remedy in private suits has been doubted.169 Further, even if
divestiture were theoretically available, as a practical matter no
court is likely to restructure a defendant after previously order-
ing some divestiture in the government's suit.
The significance of this for postjudgment intervention
should be obvious. To the extent that such actions would merely
track the relief already available under the antitrust laws, inter-
vention is likely to be denied. At the other pole, where the
government's action will for all practical purposes foreclose
further private relief, or where the antitrust laws provide a pri-
vate party with no remedy at all, intervention should be permit-
ted. The difficult question relates to the class of cases in which a
private remedy is available, but intervention would be quicker,
cheaper, or more certain. For example, a third party intervenor
could compel compliance with a decree via contempt proceed-
ings merely by proving the decree and its violation; were that
1617 Such inadequacy might exist, for example, when the applicant can demonstrate
that the relief obtainable in a purely private suit will probably be insufficient or when he
can persuasively argue that stare decisis renders it unlikely that the result in a prior
government suit will be disturbed in a subsequent private action. E.g., Nuesse v. Camp,
385 F.2d 694 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Atlantis Dev. Corp. v. United States, 379 F.2d 818 (5th
Cir. 1967).
168 See Guilfoil, Damage Determination in Private Antitrust Suits, 42 NOTRE DAME LAw.
647 (1967); Parker, Measuring Damages in Federal Treble Damage Actions, 17 ANTITRUST
BULL. 496 (1972). See also Note, 29 OHIO ST. L.J. 756, 766 (1968).
169 At least two post-Cascade lower court decisions have held divestiture available to
private plaintiffs. See generally Comment, Private Divestiture: Antitrust's Latest Problem Child,
41 FORDHAM L. REV. 569 (1973). However, at the time Cascade was decided the issue was
very much in doubt. See Note, Availability of Divestiture in Private Litigation as a Remedy for
Violation of Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 49 MINN. L. REV. 267 (1964). See also Peacock,
Private Divestiture Suits Under Section 16 of the Clayton Act, 48 TEX. L. REV. 54 (1969).
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party required to bring a private antitrust suit, he would have to
establish not only the fact of the conduct which violated the
decree but also (except in the case of strict per se offenses) its
unreasonableness as a restraint of trade. Whether requiring an
applicant to pursue a more difficult and hazardous course con-
stitutes impairing or impeding his ability to protect his interest
remains an open question. It may be that the onerousness of
alternatives will be a factor in a balancing of pro- and anti-
intervention interests. With respect to postjudgment intervention
to enforce decrees, however, the scales will usually tip in favor of
the applicant.
1 70
If, therefore, Cascade suggests that an applicant with a sub-
stantial economic stake has a rule 24(a) interest, and if failure to
permit intervention will, in at least some cases, impair or impede
his ability to protect that interest, the only remaining obstacle to
intervention is the adequacy of the government's representation.
On this point, Cascade is again of assistance. Although the facts
there were truly unique, involving the Court's perception that
the Department of Justice participated in flouting its prior
mandate,"7 ' it would seem that failure of the Department to
enforce judicial decrees is not significantly different conduct. A
court's order can be flouted just as much by ignoring it as by
cooperating in changing it.172 In any event, however, it seems
clear that the failure of the Justice Department to enforce a
decree which benefits a particular third party cannot constitute
adequate representation of that party's interests therein.
17 3
171 See text accompanying notes 185-96 infra.
"I This kind of ultra vires conduct could not, by definition, qualify as adequate
representation of the interests the Supreme Court's original mandate was designed to
protect:
We do not question the authority of the Attorney General to settle suits after, as
well as before, they reach here. The Department of Justice, however, by stipula-
tion or otherwise has no authority to circumscribe the power of the courts to see
that our mandate is carried out. No one, except this Court, has authority to alter
or modify our mandate [citation omitted]. Our direction was that the District
Court provide for "divestiture without delay." That mandate in the context of
the opinion plainly meant that Pacific Northwest or a new company be at once
restored to a position where it could compete with El Paso in the California
market.
386 U.S. at 136.
172 This is not to suggest that court orders may not appropriately be modified by
consent of the parties with the approval of the court. It is, however, dubious procedure to
permit the Department of Justice and the defendant tacitly to reach this result, without
court approval, by violations which are not prosecuted.
173 Regardless whether the Department of Justice's failure to enforce compliance is
the result of inadvertence, a considered decision that resources are better devoted else-
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The foregoing analysis suggests that, on the facts available,
Western Electric was wrongly decided. The applicant there stated
a strong economic stake in alleging that the defendant was com-
peting with it in violation of the consent decree. 174 Second, the
would-be intervenor seems to satisfy the requirement that its
ability to protect its interest be adversely affected. The ap-
plicant's alternative, a private antitrust suit, was likely to be un-
satisfactory because courts rarely enjoin competition entirely,
even by monopolists, as the decree apparently did. Finally, the
applicant's interest was not adequately represented by the gov-
ernment since the would-be intervenor alleged resort to the De-
partment of justice and its failure to act. 175
In fairness to the Western Electric result, however, it must be
admitted that there are facets to the problem of intervention
which we have not yet treated and which may influence our
conclusions. Most of our analysis has relied heavily on Cascade,
and, although that decision is not yet eight years old, its con-
tinued vitality has been much mooted. In part this is due to
several Supreme Court affirmances, without opinion, of district
court denials of intervention. And, while we have seen that such
affirmances are, individually, of little value in assessing the law
of intervention, 7 6 the pattern perceived from them has led sev-
eral district courts to doubt the continued authority of
Cascade.
7 7
With all due deference, the evidence for a retreat from
Cascade is not as strong as those courts would have it. The "pat-
tern" becomes less coherent when it is recognized that several
where or a judgment that the decree is no longer procompetitive, nonenforcement still
does not adequately represent the interests of the decree beneficiary.
174 Of course, no opinion is expressed about the wisdom of the particular decree in
question in furthering the ends of the antitrust laws.
175 The Western Electric opinion avoided this conclusion by distinguishing Cascade: it
did not involve a consent decree, and, there the Department of Justice ignored the
Supreme Court's mandate. Why either of these differences warrants a legal distinction
was not made clear. With respect to the first point, the judge was concerned that third
party enforcement would diminish defendants' incentive to enter into such decrees. As
we have seen, this is hardly persuasive since there can be no public interest in encourag-
ing defendants who intend to breach such decrees from entering into them in the first
place. On the second point, it is likely that the judge had in mind the inadequacy of the
government's representation, demonstrated in Cascade by the flouting of the Court's
mandate. But Cascade never suggested that only such action would constitute proof of
inadequate representation, and it would seem that resort to the Department of Justice
followed by no action on the applicant's complaint should establish a prima facie case of
inadequacy.
176 See text accompanying note 147 supra.
17 E.g., United States v. CIBA Corp., 50 F.R.D. 507, 512 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
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affirmances are easily reconciled with Cascade. Thus, one district
court opinion can be read as simply finding government rep-
resentation adequate,' 78 while another rested its decision on four
grounds, several of which were entirely consistent with
Cascade. 
17 9
It is true, however, that not all of the post-Cascade affir-
mances without opinion can be reconciled so easily with that
decision. To explain these, and attempt to evolve a more general
theory of the present state of the law of private intervention in
government antitrust suits, it is necessary to take into account
178 United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 41 F.R.D. 342 (E.D. Mo.), appeal
dismissed sub nora. Lupton Mfg. Co. v. United States, 388 U.S. 457 (1967).
After noting that the Antitrust Division had "diligently protected the interest of the
public," the court wrote, with respect to the would-be intervenor's claim:
The Antitrust Division has vigorously examined the situation from that time to
the present date and has required Alcoa and Cupples to submit a great deal of
information concerning the circumstances of the bidding for the purpose of
determining whether or not they have violated any provisions of the final judg-
ment of this Court. After a careful examination of this situation, the Antitrust
Division has concluded in its opinion there has been no violation warranting an
injunction and it opposes the motion of Lupton to intervene in this proceeding.
41 F.R.D. at 343.
... United States v. Blue Chip Stamp Co., 272 F. Supp. 432 (C.D. Cal. 1967), aff'dper
curiam sub noma. Thrifty Shoppers Scrip Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 580 (1968). See also
note 161 supra. The grounds the district court relied on were:
(1) the petition was not timely because the would-be intervenors waited, without
justification, until after the decree had been entered; (2) the applicants did not have their
interests impaired or impeded by the settlement since both had filed treble damages
actions; (3) the applicants had no interest as members of the general public because they
had not established that the government had not acted properly in the public interest; (4)
the claims of applicants were without merit. Obviously, the first, third and fourth
grounds do not in any sense fly in the face of Cascade, and the Supreme Court's affir-
mance may have relied on any one of them. Only the second ground poses any difficulty,
and, upon further consideration, this too disappears. The applicants, who had filed
treble damage action, failed to give any reason why intervention was necessary to protect
their interests except for the argument that the prima facie evidence effect in their
private action of a favorable judgment in the government suit under § 5(a) of the Clayton
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 16(a) (1970), was an interest that would be impaired if intervention
could not be used to force the government to litigate. See note 14 supra. The district court
rejected this contention, apparently because this did not constitute an "interest." The
result is probably correct, but it should be grounded on an affirmative governmental
privilege to settle, established by the Clayton Act itself, rather than upon the intervenor's
lack of an interest. The very statute that creates the prima facie effect of a government
judgment, thus establishing the intervenor's interest, also gives the government the right
to enter into consent decrees.
A like argument was rejected in United States v. Automobile Mfrs. Ass'n, 307 F.
Supp. 617, 621 (C.D. Cal. 1969), aff'd per curiam sub noma. City of New York v. United
States, 397 U.S. 248 (1970). See Comment, The Automobile Pollution Case: Intervention in
Consent Decree Settlement, 5 HARV. Civ. RTs.-CIv. LIB. L. REv. 408 (1970). Although not
precise in its reasons for rejecting prima facie evidence effect as an "interest" protectable
by intervention, the Court did speak of a right to settle which may be shorthand for an
affirmative governmental privilege rooted in § 5(a) of the Clayton Act.
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considerations found neither in Cascade nor in the text of rule
24(a). The two primary reasons for limiting intervention relate
to the plaintiff's interest in the right to control the course of his
suit and to the problems of spoiling the broth by introducing too
many cooks.' 80 These considerations explain, and perhaps jus-
tify, decisions which are apparently inconsistent with the analysis
heretofore developed. In the context of attempted private inter-
vention in government antitrust suits, they have a special rele-
vancy. As Mr. Justice Stewart wrote, dissenting in Cascade:
This Court is all too familiar with the fact that an-
titrust litigation is inherently protracted. Indeed, it is
just such delay which seems to so concern the Court in
this case. But nothing could be better calculated to con-
fuse and prolong antitrust litigation than the rule which
the Court today announces. The entrance of additional
parties into antitrust suits can only serve to multiply
trial exhibits and testimony, and further confound the
attempt to bring order out of complicated economic
issues.18'
Without denigrating what is obviously a substantial and legiti-
mate concern with respect to private intervention in government
antitrust suits generally, the objection is misplaced as applied to
the situation of postjudgment intervention for the purpose of
enforcing that judgment.
Consider, for example, the cases denying intervention
sought for the purpose of opposing the entry of a consent de-
cree, some of which have been affirmed without opinion by the
Supreme Court. 8 2 While perhaps marking a retreat from the
broadest possible reading of Cascade, these decisions left largely
undisturbed our analysis of postjudgment intervention. They
represent a judicial balancing of the possible impairment of pri-
vate interests against the government's interest in deciding when
and on what terms to terminate its litigation. But when such a
balancing test is applied to postjudgment applications, there is
little to counterbalance the reasons favoring intervention.
18O Cf. Kennedy, supra note 142.
181 386 U.S. at 147-48.
182 United States v. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 319 F. Supp. 930 (E.D. Pa. 1970);
United States v. CIBA Corp., 50 F.R.D. 507 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); United States v. Atlantic
Richfield Co., 50 F.R.D. 369 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd sub nom. Bartlett v. United States, 401
U.S. 986 (1971); United States v. Automobile Mfrs. Ass'n, 307 F. Supp. 617 (C.D. Cal.
1969), aff'd sub nom. City of New York v. United States, 397 U.S. 248 (1970).
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To begin with, Stewart's concern that intervention will com-
plicate and prolong the litigation is largely inapposite simply
because the litigation has already culminated in a final judgment.
This same consideration seems equally telling with respect to the
government's interest in controlling its resource allocation. As
Professor Buxbaum notes, there are considerations cutting
against intervention to oppose settlement of a suit that do not
apply in other contexts. Forcing the government to litigate in-
volves at least quantitatively different results in Antitrust Divi-
sion resource allocation than does intervention merely to "re-
shape the direction of the litigation or the emphasis of particular
items."
183
It is true, of course, that some postjudgment interventions
may have effects analogous to lengthening and complicating the
litigation. For example, when one of the original parties seeks a
modification of the decree, the presence of an intervenor may
complicate the proceedings, as in the Pipe Line case. This possi-
bility, however, does not justify barring intervention in those
cases where no modification is at issue. Along these lines, Profes-
sor Shapiro has suggested that courts ought to be more flexible
with respect to intervention; instead of an all-or-nothing ap-
proach, intervenors should be given different bundles of rights
appropriate to the necessity and convenience of the proceeding
in question.
184
One can go further, however, and contend that there are at
least three reasons why postjudgment intervention is distinctly
different from pretrial intervention, and warrants more liberal
treatment. First, any modification inquiry necessarily must focus
on the presence or absence of changed circumstances, and will
not involve a fullblown antitrust trial. Accordingly, the argument
that intervention may prolong and complicate an already lengthy
and complex proceeding has much less weight in this context.' 85
The intervenor may also have a much stronger interest in
influencing a postjudgment than a pretrial proceeding, simply
183 Buxbaum, supra note 143, at 1136.
184 Shapiro, supra note 142, at 743-48. See also, Comment, Private Participation in
Department of Justice Antitrust Proceedings, 39 U. Cu. L. REV. 143 (1971).
18- There may be exceptions to this general rule. The ones that come readily to mind
are the "regulatory" decrees which envision continuing judicial control of a particular
industry. In such cases complex fact determinations may continually be made after
judgment is entered, and postjudgment intervention may have many of the disadvan-
tages of pretrial intervention. See Note, An Experiment in Preventive Anti-trust: Judicial
Regulation of the Motion Picture Exhibition Market Under the Paramount Decrees, 74 YALE L.J.
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because it may have ventured much in reliance on the decree. If
decrees are to be effective, such reliance ought to be encouraged
by the government. Finally, the possible distortion of antitrust
policies which may result from private interests intervening
ought to be significantly less in the case of a consent decree
-where the procompetitive thrust has already been stipulated
by the Department of Justice and approved by a court.
If problems of complicating the government suit or distort-
ing Department of Justice resource allocation are likely to be of
little weight in the postjudgment context, then we must inquire
whether there are other anti-intervention considerations. These
need not detain us long. It has sometimes been suggested that
the fact that Congress has established two separate schemes of
relief, public and private, makes private intervention in govern-
ment suits inappropriate. 186 But it seems clear that as a matter of
authority, Cascade has rejected any strict dichotomy, 8 7 and,
on the merits, the basis for the argument has always been
questionable.1
8 8
1041, 1045-49 (1965). However, even with respect to such decrees, private involvement is
not necessarily inappropriate. For example, in the essentially regulatory decree covering
ASCAP, one implementation device employed by the judgment is authorizing third per-
sons to apply to the district court for determination of a reasonable royalty. See notes
37-39 supra & accompanying text.
IN Cascade, 386 U.S. at 148 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
187 It is clear that even before Cascade the "rule" of nonintervention in government
antitrust suits was subject to exception. E.g., Missouri-Kansas Pipe Line Co. v. United
States, 312 U.S. 502 (1941); United States v. Vehicular Parking, Ltd., 7 F.R.D. 336 (D.
Del. 1947).
188 The rationale for a dichotomy between public and private schemes of relief has
perhaps best been articulated in United States v. Bendix Home Appliances Inc., 10
F.R.D. 73 (S.D.N.Y. 1949).
The Bendix case bases its contentions on the proposition that a private party may not
bring an injunction suit under § 4 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 4 (1970). Private suits
for injunction were not permitted at all under the Sherman Act, but were authorized
only by the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1970). From this statutory scheme, the court
concludes:
It would seem to be a necessary corollary of this dichotomy of rights which
underlies the structure of the anti-trust laws that private persons may not inter-
vene in suits which are maintainable only by the United States. And this corol-
lary should apply whether the particular action is for enforcement of the anti-
trust laws, or for the enforcement of decrees rendered under those laws.
10 F.R.D. at 76. This reasoning is extremely tenuous. First, although § 4 of the Sherman
Act permits only a government, not a private suit, any rigid separation of two schemes of
relief was ended by the Clayton Act, which gave private parties the right also to seek
injunctive relief. Second, it does not necessarily follow that a private party may not
intervene in a suit brought by the government to enforce a decree obtained by the
government, even if the party could not have brought the suit originally. Cf. Trobvich v.
UMW, 404 U.S. 528 (1972). To the extent that the original Sherman Act's failure to
provide private parties an injunction action reflected a considered judgment that such
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Another objection to intervention is the notion that the De-
partment of Justice alone must speak for the public interest.
189
The rationale underlying this objection is not clear. To the ex-
tent that it either reflects fear of confusing the government's liti-
gation or of introducing issues tainted by self-interest, it merely
reformulates what has been discussed before. Further, the ar-
gument, even if accepted, is not fatal to all intervention. If the
government favors it, surely intervention ought to be allowed
under this notion without regard to the defendant's views.
Where the government is neutral, this objection has no effect;
intervention then ought to be allowed or not according to other
relevant policy considerations. Only when the government op-
poses intervention does the notion of the government alone
speaking for the public interest have any bite. And even here
one would think that, as to postjudgment intervention at least, it
is not very compelling. The government and the court have, by
definition, already spoken for the public interest. And while the
public interest, or at least particular views of it, need not remain
static, some weight should be accorded the prior view. One way
to do this is, of course, precisely by allowing an intervenor to
seek to enforce the judgment and say what may be said in its
defense. Finally, the idea that the Department of Justice is the
sole body entitled to enforce the antitrust laws runs counter to
the strong "private attorneys general" concept running through
the laws themselves.' 90 The Supreme Court has recognized
that the purposes of the antitrust laws are best served by
insuring that the private action will be an ever-present
threat to deter anyone contemplating business behavior
in violation of the antitrust laws. The plaintiff who
reaps the reward of treble damages may be no less mor-
ally reprehensible than the defendant, but the law en-
courages his suit to further the overriding public policy
in favor of competition. 191
power in private hands might unjustifiably clog the judicial process, this problem is
largely obviated by the fact that the government obtained the injunction, thereby raising
a presumption that the public interest is served by its terms.
189 Mr. Justice Stewart, dissenting in Cascade, made this argument, 386 U.S. at 149,
attributing the notion to Buckeye Coal & Ry. Co. v. Hocking Valley Ry. Co., 269 U.S. 42,
49 (1925). See note 31 supra. Interestingly, Buckeye is not inconsistent with this argument,
the decision there only denied intervention to set aside the district court's order.
19o See text accompanying note 53 supra.
191 Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 139 (1968).
See also Guilfoil, supra note 168; Maclntyre, Antitrust Injunctions-A Flexible Private Remedy,
1966 DUKE L.J. 22.
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Intervention has also been opposed along the familiar lines
of a "deluge of litigation," always cited to defeat any new ap-
proaches in the law. The species of this genus with which we are
now concerned is the "flood of intervenors." While the argument
is not always without merit, it is usually grossly overdrawn, which
is precisely the case here. If the intervention is only to obtain
enforcement of a decree, the first successful intervenor who
"adequately represents" persons in like positions will bar further
interventions under rule 24(a)(2). Even if damages are sought
for breach of the judgment (perhaps warranting multiple inter-
ventions) there are adequate devices, including perhaps class in-
tervention, to keep the problem manageable. In any event, real
difficulties are posed only when numerous persons are being
damaged by the defendant's noncompliance with a prior court
order. In this case, the Department of Justice is most likely to
act, and, failing that, this is precisely the situation where the
policy reasons underlying third party enforcement are strongest.
Accordingly, vindication of the national antitrust policy may
prove a sufficient impetus for coping with the flood. A final
rebuttal to the argument is perhaps the most convincing: to the
extent that intervention is substituted for private antitrust suits,
the net effect is likely to be a decrease in the drain on judicial
resources.
A last objection to postjudgment intervention arises from
the language of rule 24 itself. Intervention is permissible only if
the application is "timely," and the question arises whether a
postjudgment application is timely.1 92 While, absent special cir-
cumstances, it should be clear that such an application is not
timely when the purpose of the intervention is to modify a
decree, 93 there is no reason why it should not be considered
timely with respect to enforcing one, at least if the applicant does
not sleep on his right to intervene after the decree defendant
breaches. 94 Certainly, Pipe Line allows postjudgment inter-
vention.1 95 Although that case is distinguishable as a species of
intervention not within rule 24, the notion of timeliness still
would seem applicable to this kind of intervention.
M9 See NAACP v. New York, 413 U.S. 345, 365-69 (1973).
M9 United States v. Blue Chip Stamp Co., 272 F. Supp. 432, 435-36 (C.D. Cal., 1967),
aff'd per curiam sub nom. Thrifty Shoppers Scrip Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 580 (1968).
See also note 161 supra.
"I See, e.g., McDonald v. E.J. Lavino Co., 430 F.2d 1065 (5th Cir. 1970).
195 See text accompanying notes 35 & 36 supra.
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In sum, the objections to intervention, whatever their valid-
ity with respect to earlier stages, are not persuasive as regards
postjudgment intervention. And the reasons in favor of permit-
ting the practice are compelling. On the basis of rule 24(a) and
the decisions interpreting it, the postjudgment applicant will
often qualify. Furthermore, all of the policy reasons favoring the
recognition of a third party beneficiary right are applicable to
intervention, and at least some of the possible objections to the
contract theory are inapplicable here. For example, since inter-
vention is, by definition, before the same court which rendered
the judgment in question, there is no problem with different and
possibly conflicting interpretations of the same decree. 196
IV. CONCLUSION
The implications of judicial recognition of either theory of
third party enforcement remain to be treated. Unfortunately,
these can only be sketched in broad outline because of the many
variables involved. For example, court adoption of the interven-
tion theory will have significantly different consequences than
would recognition of a third party beneficiary right, if only be-
cause, unlike the contract theory, intervention would be available
with respect to both litigated and consent decrees. Further, the
contours of the rights recognized under either theory remain to
be shaped, and the full implications of the theories will emerge
only after the courts have engaged in this process. For example,
the reach of the third party beneficiary notion will depend in
large part upon judicial application of the "intent to benefit"
concept.
Nevertheless, it is possible at this time to suggest some of the
developments which may follow recognition of either theory. For
this purpose, the consent decrees in the 1973-2 volume of CCH
Trade Cases were examined. Consent decrees were chosen, since
the third party beneficiary theory would be limited to such de-
crees and the intervention notion would encompass them. Al-
though the time period was arbitrarily selected, the cases, re-
gardless of their representativeness, constitute the minimum
situations where the theories may be utilized by private plaintiffs
if the defendants violate the decree and the government fails to
act. Of course, no opinion is expressed about the likelihood of
'96 See text accompanying notes 127-34 supra.
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either of these eventualities with respect to the particular decrees
in question.
As might be expected, most of the decrees, at least in part,
prohibit practices which are per se illegal. For example, United
States v. Clark Mechanical Contractors, Inc. 197 enjoins price fixing
and territorial division. To the extent that consent decrees enjoin
only this kind of conduct, third party action based on the decree
has few advantages over suit under the antitrust laws.' 98 Indeed,
it may be of substantially less utility to the plaintiff than a private
antitrust action, since success in the latter will bring treble dam-
ages and attorneys' fees. However, a careful examination of the
decrees shows that the conduct they prohibit is often not limited
to that which is per se illegal. In these cases, enforcement of the
decrees themselves, without need to resort to a private antitrust
suit, may be of significant assistance to decree beneficiaries.
One example of this is United States v. Bankers Trust.' 99 The
consent decree permitted the merger of two defendant banks,
but barred them for ten years, absent prior Antitrust Division
approval, from acquiring any commercial bank "in the same
county in which either or both Defendant Banks currently have
a commercial banking office, or in any country contiguous
thereto"-a total of thirty-one of South Carolina's forty-six
counties.2 °° Considering the difficulty that private plaintiffs have
in attacking mergers, 20 ' the right to invoke this decree could
prove invaluable if defendants were disposed to violate it and the
Justice Department did not act.
20 2
Much the same can be said of cases enjoining the consenting
defendants from refusing to sell. For example, the decree in
197 1973-2 Trade Cas. 74,648 (W.D. Ky. 1973).
198 This may somewhat overstate the case since there are incidental differences in the
theories which may have significant effects in particular cases. For example, it is possible
that a contract suit will be allowed when the antitrust suit is foreclosed by the applicable
federal statute of limitations if the state statute for breach of contract has not yet run.
199 1973-2 Trade Cas. 74,687 (D.S.C. 1973).
200 Id. at 95,038.
201 See P. AREEDA ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 72-73 (2nd ed. 1974), & cases cited therein.
See also A.B.A. ANTITRUST DEVELOPMENTS 1955-1968 (1968).
202 See United States v. Texaco Inc., 1973-2 Trade Cas. 74,831 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
The decree enjoined not only Texaco's acquisition of a refinery for ten years without
prior Department of Justice approval, but also prohibited Texaco from "entering into
crude oil processing agreements" for that refinery in excess of "45,000 barrels a day or
25 percent of the refinery's capacity, whichever is the lesser." Id. at 95,696. Presumably a
party foreclosed from the refinery by a breach of this provision would have a chance to
challenge that foreclosure under the theories considered.
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United States v. Ed. Phillips & Sons Co. 203 restrains the defendant,
inter alia, from "[r]efusing to sell ... to any person because of the
prices, markups, or other terms or conditions" at which that
person sells.2 0 4 While a concerted refusal to deal is a per se
offense, the decree precludes not only this action but also a
"mere" unilateral refusal, conduct traditionally immune from
antitrust scrutiny in the absence of monopolization or an attempt
to monopolize. 20 5 The injunction in Phillips is apparently not
atypical since several other consent decrees also restrict the right
of decree defendants unilaterally to refuse to deal.
20 6
A number of decrees bar resale price maintenance, conduct
which is per se illegal under the Sherman Act except when it is
immunized by state fair trade laws.20 7 Although some of the
decrees themselves exempt from their prohibitions defendant's
exercise of rights under such laws,20 8 at least one does not.
2 0 9
This suggests that a decree beneficiary able to utilize successfully
either a third party beneficiary claim or intervention to enforce
the consent decree would be able in this matter to attack resale
price maintenance, even in a state with a fair trade law legitimiz-
ing such conduct.
The conclusion to be drawn is obvious: there are significant
areas in which one or both theories of third party enforcement
might provide a decree beneficiary with real advantages over
presently recognized remedies. Of course, the extent to which
the exercise of such rights is necessary to vindicate the provisions
203 1973-2 Trade Cas. 74,606 (D. Neb. 1973).
204 Id. at 94,675.
205 United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919). United States v. Parke, Davis
& Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960), was thought by some to have sounded the death knell for the
Colgate doctrine, but that has clearly not been the case as to all applications. Fulda,
Individual Refusals to Deal: When Does Single-Firm Conduct Become Vertical Restraint?, 30 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROB. 590 (1965). But cf. United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S.
365, 376 (1967).
206 United States v. United Scientific Co., 1973-2 Trade Cas. 74,776, at 95,469
(N.D. Cal. 1973); United States v. Swift Instruments, Inc., 1973-2 Trade Cas. 74,762, at
95,317 (N.D. Cal. 1973); United States v. Wohl Shoe Co., 1973-2 Trade Cas. T 74,633, at
94,796-97 (D.N.M. 1973); United States v. Greater Portland Convention Ass'n, 1973-2
Trade Cas. 74,614, at 94,717 (D. Ore. 1973).
2'7See A.B.A. ANTITRUST DEVELOPMENTS 1955-1968, at 110-19 (1968); UNITED
STATES DEPT. OF JUSTICE, REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMITTEE TO STUDY
THE ANTITRUST LAWS, 149-55 (1955).
20s See United States v. United Scientific Co., 1973-2 Trade Cas. 9 74,776, at 95,469
(N.D. Cal. 1973); United States v. Swift Instruments, Inc. 1973-2 Trade Cas. 74,762, at
95,317 (N.D. Cal. 1973).
209 United States v. Ed. Phillips & Sons Co., 1973-2 Trade Cas. T 74,606 (D. Neb.
1973).
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of the decree in question depends on the effectiveness of De-
partment of Justice compliance machinery. While no definitive
answer to this question can be given without the kind of empiri-
cal study beyond the scope of this Article, both the scholarly
commentary and the persistent, if disjointed, attempts by third
persons to enforce government decrees suggest that recognition
of such a right would result fairly frequently in enforcement
where there is little or none now. It is the thesis of this Article
that the doctrinal and policy arguments establish a convincing
case in favor of such a right.*
* The Supreme Court's decision in United States v. ITT Continental Baking Co.,
43 U.S.L.W. 4266 (U.S. Feb. 19, 1975), handed down as this Article goes to press, adds
at least indirect support to the third party beneficiary theory considered. The central
issue in Continental Baking was whether the violation of a Federal Trade Commission
consent order barring Continental from "acquiring" certain firms constituted a single
act, warranting only one fine, or a continuing violation subjecting the violator to daily
penalties. In reaching its conclusion that daily penalties were appropriate, the Court in-
terpreted the consent order to bar not only the initial acquisition but also the continued
retention of the acquired firm. Since the language of the order was, at best, ambiguous,
the Court looked to a variety of indicia of "intent" not actually present in the consent
order, including (1) an appendix to the agreement between the parties which set forth
the background of the controversy and referred to the original FTC complaint, and
(2) the antitrust context of the consent order in which "acquiring" is said to refer both to
attaining and retaining control of a firm.
Full examination of the meaning of Continental Baking must be left for another day.
The decision certainly goes substantially further than United States v. Armour & Co.,
402 U.S. 673 (1971), in according interpretative latitude to the courts where consent
decrees are concerned, although it is doubtful if it reaches as far toward overruling that
case as the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Stewart (in which Justices Burger, Powell
and Rehnquist joined) suggests, if only because Mr. Justice Marshall, the author of the
Armour opinion, joined the Continental Baking majority. For our purposes, however,
three aspects of the opinion need be stressed. First, the majority remained faithful to the
basic predicate of Armour that it is "a contract we are construing." Thus, the overarching
principle it applied was phrased in contractual terms:
Since a consent decree or order is to be construed for enforcement pur-
poses basically as a contract, reliance upon certain aids to construction is prop-
er, as with any other contract. Such aids include the circumstances surround-
ing the formation of the consent order, any technical meaning words used may
have had to the parties, and any other documents expressly incorporated in the
decree. Such reliance does not in any way depart from the "four corners" rule
of Armour.
43 U.S.L.W. at 4271 (footnote omitted). No opinion is, of course, intimated as to the cor-
rectness under general contract law of the Court's application of this principle to the
facts before it.
Secondly, the Continental Baking Court gave implicit approval to the proposition,
urged in the Article, that there is nothing inherent in consent decrees that precludes the
application of a contract law where sound policy indicates it is appropriate:
Consent decrees and orders have attributes both of contracts and of
judicial decrees, or, in this case, administrative orders .... Because of this dual
character, consent decrees are treated as contracts for some purposes but not
for others.
Id. at 4270 n.10.
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Third, the instant case provides support for another position taken in the Article,
namely, that in view of the fact that a consent decree violator has both breached his
promise and committed a contempt of court, it is not unfair to hold him liable, even
retroactively, to a third party who has been injured by this wrongful conduct. Speaking
to an analogous point, the Continental Baking majority wrote:
We note that this case differs from Armour ... in a most important respect.
In [that case] the question of whether or not the consent decree was violated
was the question for decision; in this case respondent was found to have com-
mitted violations, and the issue before us affects only the manner of assigning
penalties for each violation found. Thus respondent is subject to some penalty,
and there is no possibility as there was in Armour . . . that respondent will be
penalized for behavior not prohibited at all by the order "within its four
corners ....
Id. at 4271. In sum, Continental Baking provides no basis for reassessing the positions
taken in the Article, and, indeed, offers some further support for them.
